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Foreword  
Raymond Hinnebusch 
In this volume, Syria’s most prominent development economist delivers a 
judicious and detailed assessment of Syria’s road to economic reform. This 
is based on his intimate experience with the political economy of the 
country over many years, including his participation in the preparation of 
numerous reports on reform for the government, private sector and 
international institutions. Seifan remains an independent economist and 
social thinker, who, however, accepts the board limits of the regime’s 
reform project while asking what its actual results have been and what 
would be needed if it were to achieve its stated aim of a ‘social market 
economy’— a market economy that avoids the extremes of inequality from 
unregulated capitalism.   
In the first essay in the volume, he traces the process of Syria’s reform, 
the forces pushing and obstructing it, and the debates and options 
considered by policymakers. He explains the regime’s reluctance to lay out 
a detailed plan of reform from a fear it would coalesce opposition and a 
sense that, feeling its way by experiment, its path must not be straitjacketed; 
the cost is that confidence, notably among investors, in the durability and 
direction of reform remains shallow. He shows, however, that the decision 
for reform is irreversible, at least in its broad lines, and lays out in detail the 
steps and consequences of reform in the first decade of Bashar al-Asad’s 
presidency.  
In the second part of the volume, switching from descriptive/analytical 
mode to prescriptive, Seifan lays out a plausible model of the “Social 
Market” economy the regime ostensibly seeks to create. He locates this 
model within the context of debates in Syria and identifies a tendency for 
the ‘reformists’ in government to uncritically adopt the viewpoint of neo-
liberalism that social welfare provisions merely detract from investment and 
growth and must be sacrificed to the need to restart a capitalist economy. In 
theoretical terms, he situates the social market model between the failures of 
statism and the perils of extreme neo-liberalism, arguing for a mixed 
economy, in which, not only would the state regulate the market, provide a 
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minimum of welfare, and organize capital-labor relations, but also would 
foster a widespread distribution of property, notably cooperatives and small 
enterprises, while at the same time encouraging the adoption of value-added 
industries and the formation of a more skilled labor force through 
investment in human capital.  
Lastly, the appendix contains the proceedings of a conference, “Syria in 
a Changing World” (held in Damascus in November 2008 jointly by the 
Centre for Syrian Studies and the Orient Institute of Studies) which provides 
a formidable example of the vivid debate on economic reform in Syria. 
From this volume, the reader will learn much about the political 
economy of reform in Syria, will be sensitized to the debates over the 
process and will benefit from a wealth of detail on specific outcomes after 
several years of reform.  

      
7 
1 
The Reform Paradox in Syria 
Samir Seifan 
The history of reform before 2000 
The blockage of Syria’s first opening 
Syria’s foreign policy and its domestic economic policy are inextricably 
linked. Few people would realize that Syria had prepared to return to a 
capitalist market economy as early as after the October war in 1973: During 
that period, the economy was opened on a larger scale, Syria allowed the 
first foreign (American) oil company to operate in the country, US President 
Nixon visited Damascus in 1974 and Syria received considerable assistance 
from the pro-Western oil-producing countries in the Arab world while some 
tensions appeared in relations with the eastern bloc. The opening towards 
private investment gained momentum and the Syrian-Western 
rapprochement was crowned by Syria's entrance into Lebanon in 1976 with 
French and American blessing to stop the civil war which had erupted in 
1975. During the first stages of intervention, Syria sided with the pro-west 
"rightist forces" and clashed with the Palestinians and pro-Palestinian 
Lebanese “national” forces.  
However, foreign policy returned Syria to its original tangent after 
President Sadat visited Jerusalem in 1977 and signed the Camp David 
agreement in 1978. Syria opposed the bilateral peace signed by Sadat and 
called for a comprehensive peace agreement between the Arabs and Israel. 
Another significant event that played a decisive role in Syria's political and 
economic orientation was the Muslim Brotherhood insurgency of the late 
1970s/early 1980s which received direct financial and moral support from a 
considerable part of the Syrian business sector, and some of the 
conservative Arab monarchies as well as moral support from the western 
media and US officials, with western countries providing asylum to 
Brotherhood leaders. The United States listed Syria among the terrorism-
sponsoring countries in 1979 and the pro-Western Arab countries started to 
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reduce their financial contributions to Syria. All the preceding factors 
contributed to the economic crisis that erupted in the second half of the 
1980s. But their immediate impact was to improve relations with the eastern 
bloc countries crowned by the signing of the Syrian-Soviet Friendship 
Agreement in 1980. In Lebanon, where approximately 40,000 Syrian 
soldiers were deployed, Syria revised its position and allied with the 
Palestinians. The limited Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 followed by 
the second invasion in 1982 and the direct clash with Syrian troops, that 
ended with the Israel occupation of southern Lebanon for 18 years, until 
2000, consolidated Syrian opposition to western policy in the region. Here 
also, political events impacted on economic developments.   
Syria halted the limited economic opening of the mid 1970s toward the 
private sector, and revived such slogans as “the leading role of the public 
sector.” As a result, the inflow of Arab capital began to diminish from the 
early 1980s and the investment climate in Syria became less and less 
attractive. Syrian capital continued to exit the country and government 
spending exceeded fiscal revenues, which prompted deficit spending by 
direct borrowing from the Syrian Central Bank. Between 1976 – 1980 the 
state budget deficit reached around 49% and government to the central bank 
went from 6 billion SP in 1976 to 74 billion in 1986. The money supply 
grew around 27% between 1975 and 1985 whereas GDP grew only  14.5%. 
The reserve of hard currency and gold went down to 2% where the 
minimum limit is 10% according the currency law. The country’s foreign 
reserves hit bottom in 1987. This in turn forced the government to stop 
financing many public enterprises, whose production halted or declined 
sharply. Public as well as private job opportunities receded and 
unemployment emerged as a socioeconomic problem. These problems 
reached crisis proportions after 1986 as indicated by the rapid depreciation 
of the Syrian pound against foreign currencies. The dollar price rose from 
SYP 3.90 in 1079 to SYP 5.52 in 1980, around SYP 10 in 1985, SYP 20 in 
1986 and SYP 45 by the end of the 1980s. This was associated with a big 
increase in inflation levels which reached 15-25% or higher, resulting in 
increased prices and deteriorating purchasing power of groups living on 
fixed incomes, consequently affecting the living standards of most Syrians. 
Shortages of goods and services became familiar and essential items 
disappeared from the market such as vegetable oil, margarine, sugar, tea and 
coffee. Smuggling became widespread especially across the Syrian-
Lebanese borders. Illicit enrichment widened and parasitic capitalists 
thrived by exploiting relations with decision-making centers. The regime 
deliberately tolerated or encouraged such corruption to secure the loyalty of 
segments of the bourgeoisie and key regime figures in its struggle against 
the Muslim Brotherhood. It rewarded Damascus businessmen for their 
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loyalty during the struggle while it punished Aleppo for siding with the 
Muslim Brotherhood. In the same period, a bureaucratic bourgeoisie 
emerged among high ranking state officials and managers and the political 
and military leaderships.   
Limited reforms after the mid-1980s crisis 
The intensifying internal economic crisis was paralleled by the 1985 
launching of perestroika in the Soviet Union and communist East Europe in 
which these countries tried to revive their private sectors. Simultaneously, 
Soviet political support to Syria started to decline. These developments 
encouraged a revival of liberal economic thinking in Syria. The government, 
unable to confront the crisis by itself, felt the need to promote the private 
sector to assume part of the economic burden, despite its suspicion of 
private capital. Syria, despite the 1960s nationalizations, has always 
maintained an active private sector. Agriculture remained private except for 
some state farms; private manufacturing industries had regained growth 
since the 1970s; land transport, contracting, and domestic trade remained in 
the hands of the private sector with only a limited role by public institutions; 
and the private artisan sector remained widespread. Amidst the crisis, Syria 
took some steps toward further opening to the private sector although they 
were ad hoc measures to relieve the crisis and not built on a comprehensive 
concept or integrated vision of economic reform. The government widened 
the scope for private enterprises and ceded some of its monopolies in 
foreign trade. Decree 186 of 1985 by the Higher Council for Tourism 
promoted investment in tourism through limited tax exemptions and 
facilitating the import of tourist requirements and dealing in foreign 
currencies. Then Law 10 of 1986 was issued to promote joint agricultural 
investment between the state (that provides land) and the private sector (that 
provides capital). Overall, the private sector contribution to GDP increased 
from a low of 30% in the 1960s to 37% in 1980 (today it is around 65%). 
Syria had, since the beginning of the Perestroika, tried to approach the 
West. The question for the Syrian leadership was how to do so at an 
affordable price. The opportunity came with the second Gulf war when 
Syria joined the international coalition under American leadership against 
Iraq, and thereafter through its participation in the Madrid peace conference. 
This external realignment was followed by a further internal opening up, 
crowned by Law 10 of 1991 which constituted the cornerstone of all 
liberalization steps before 2001. All these cumulative measures attracted a 
wave of investments in the first half of the 1990s, in particular in the fields 
of industry and transport.  
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The economic crisis was greatly eased in the first half of the 1990s by a 
combination of factors. First, Syria’s participation in the second Gulf War 
was rewarded by the US, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries with an 
inflow of financial support, easy loans and facilitated entry of Syrian labor 
to the Gulf countries. Second, increased oil production from new fields 
discovered by Royal Dutch Shell in 1985 in Deir Ezzor and French Elf-
Aquitaine when added to that of the Syrian Petroleum Company brought 
total production from 170,000 barrel per day (b/d) in 1985 to 408,000 b/d in 
1990 and over 620,000 b/d in 1996 before it decreased to 556,000 b/d in 
2000 and 360,000 b/d in 2005. Second the regime’s agriculture support 
policy paid off: subsidizing the prices of products bought from local farmers 
(wheat, barley, cotton, sugar beet, lentil and chickpea), at levels higher than 
global prices, provision of seeds, fertilizers and medicines at subsidized 
prices and making available easy, long/short term agricultural loans (in kind 
and in cash) transformed Syria into a country with a constantly growing 
agricultural surplus. Syria became a wheat exporter after being a wheat 
importer in the 1980s and wheat is an essential component in the diet of the 
poor. Fourth, increased opportunities were given to the private sector, with 
state import monopolies relinquished and imports facilitated by allowing the 
use of “export proceeds currency” to cover import costs. This, however, 
eased the subsidy pressure on the state treasury and shifted it to citizens, and 
increased prices, leading to deteriorating living standards especially for state 
employees, turning middle-income groups into low-income groups.  
The problem was that the government did not follow up Law 10 with 
any further reforms or articulate a broader reform program with the result 
that investment slowed down. Further reform was deterred by the easing of 
the economic crisis but also by fears for political stability. Empowering the 
private sector would lead the bourgeoisie to seek political power as it had 
done in the 1980s when it supported the Muslim Brotherhood insurgency. 
The instability unleashed by economic reform in Eastern Europe and 
Algeria also induced caution in Syria. As a result investors’ enthusiasm 
cooled down causing an investment recession as of 1995, which slowed 
economic growth, falling to minus growth in 1999 which was coupled with 
higher levels of population growth, unemployment and capital drain. Syria 
had fallen again into economic crisis. Starting in 1998, the regime reversed 
years of antagonism to Iraq and tried to benefit from the situation there by 
developing economic ties. This helped alleviate the economic crisis but this 
temporary relief would be closed off by the American occupation of Iraq in 
2003. In retrospect, the failure to consolidate the economic reforms 
prefigured by Law 10 with new measures led to the perception of the 1990s 
as a lost decade. However, this experience had a lasting effect on pro-reform 
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currents inside the regime whose attitude towards reform turned by the end 
of the decade from "caution" into "support". 
Economic reform under President Bashar Al-Asad 
On June 10th, 2000, President Hafez Al-Assad died after having ruled Syria 
for three decades (16/11/1970 to 10/6/2000). A smooth transfer of power 
took place in a referendum in July 2000, when his son Bashar was elected 
president for a 7-year term. Seven years later, on May 27, 2007 a second 
referendum was conducted for a new 7-year term, which will last till 
summer 2014. Economic reform assumed comprehensive and stable 
characteristics during the first presidential term.  
Bashar’s first inauguration speech stressed the need for “a 
comprehensive development strategy providing a specific framework for 
steps and measures to be taken to achieve this strategy.” The speech also set 
out strategic guidelines for “taking steady and firm steps, albeit piecemeal, 
towards…economic change.” The speech seemed to promise change, and 
Syrians were hopeful after decades of an authoritarian-run statist economy. 
While promising change, the speech focused on the technical aspects of the 
reform process without specifying an economic orientation or the nature of 
economic system that would result. It only mentioned enhancing private 
investment while maintaining but reforming the public sector. 
For many reasons, the approach of the government was to push 
dialogue and action towards economic rather than political reform. The first 
step was the creation of the “Committee of 18”, named after the 18 Syrian 
economists who prepared the first report about the state economy and means 
of reform. The report did not lead to any practical applications and was 
perhaps aimed at initiating dialogue about new ideas of economic reform in 
Syria. In the spring of 2001, the “Committee of 35” was set up to discuss 
means to reform the public industrial sector. It recommended financial and 
administrative autonomy to allow sufficient flexibility for the sector to work 
within a competitive market environment. However, its recommendations 
again were not implemented. In June 2002, a ministerial committee 
developed an economic reform draft. As a result, large-scale discussions 
were initiated involving the government, the Baath Party, economic experts, 
the interested public and local media. The 9-month discussions led to setting 
up a 7-expert technical committee on February 25, 2003, by virtue of a 
decision by Prime Minister Mustapha Miro to redraft the economic reform 
program. It completed this task within three months and presented its report 
to the Prime Minister. The report was brushed aside like previous programs 
and reports. Again, when the French government delegated a number of 
teams to study the situation in Syria between 2003 and 2004 and to propose 
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administrative and judicial reforms, their recommendations were not 
implemented although this did result in establishing a branch of the National 
Institute of Public Administration (INA); a well known French institute for 
qualifying civil service middle managers. It appears that the purpose of 
these committees and reports was to open discussions about needed change 
and to prepare the state institutions and society to accept them.  
The American occupation of Iraq in March 2003 had a negative impact 
on the then ongoing dialogue regarding political and economic reforms. 
After 2004, no further attempts were made to draft an economic reform 
program. Instead, the government concentrated on what could practically be 
achieved without having to formulate the reform tendencies into a 
document. In 2005, despite the convening of the 10th national conference of 
the Baath party, the reform dialogue was not resumed and the government 
replaced further discussion of economic reforms with the issuing of the 10th 
Five Year Plan (2006-2010) as a key instrument to guide the economy. This 
was a sort of returning to old rules of planning from above; and even if the 
FYP included specific discussions regarding the reform program, it had no 
practical value for the implementation of reform.  
The struggle over economic reform  
While the Syrian government meant to contain any political struggle over 
economic reforms, this struggle seemed too strong to stifle and had already 
acquired deep roots. Economic reform is a controversial issue governed by 
two sets of contradictions. The first are contradictions of a more technical 
and non-contentious nature, which occur as a result of difficult choices 
coupled with the difficulty and fear of change. These contradictions 
emanate from differences in viewpoints among business people, leaders of 
governmental economic departments and economic researchers over the 
most efficient means of stimulating socio-economic development. The 
second set of contradictions lies in contentious political tendencies, 
emanating from conflicting interests since any reform program is a 
representation of class, group or personal interests, which contradict and 
oppose other interests. In this sense, adopting a market economy is more 
than a technical position in the interest of greater efficiency or raising 
productivity. It is rather a social decision involving conflict between 
powerful interests. That conflict is not only about a choice between 
centralized economy and market economy, but also about what type of 
market economy and about the roles and interests of different groups or 
people within this market economy. Reform is economic in scope and social 
in results, and above all it is a political decision par excellence. Economic 
reform in Syria has been trapped between pressures exerted by two major 
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different forces: one pushing towards reform and the other raising obstacles 
in front of it. 
Forces pushing towards reform 
The disintegration of the former socialist camp deprived the Syrian 
economy of a major source of support. This paved the way to shift from the 
statist economic system. This economic system went into crisis because the 
partial reforms of the mid 1980s proved ineffective. When economic 
recession reappeared in the second half of the 1990s it became evident to 
the Syrian leadership that maintaining the former economic system was 
likely to yield more harm than good and that change was inevitable.  
Another factor was expanding globalization--the progress of free 
market economies worldwide, and greater interaction between national 
economies and international markets, with higher importance assigned to 
export and investment promotion. This has been pressuring the Syrian 
economy to shift to a market economy and acquire its legislative, regulatory 
and institutional infrastructures.  
Syria's foreign economic relations also constitute a considerable source 
of pressure towards a market economy. The Great Arab Free Trade 
Agreement (GAFTA) agreement, the negotiations on a Syrian-European 
association agreement, widening economic and commercial relations, 
relations with international organizations and even diplomatic relations are 
generating constant pressures on policy-makers to move faster towards the 
realization of a market economy.  A conviction evolved that a market 
economy and expanding the role of the private sector would ultimately 
contribute to improving Syria’s relations with western European countries, 
which have fluctuated between cold, strained and tense on various 
occasions. 
Facilitating the move toward the market was the fact that Syria had 
maintained, even under statism, a relatively strong private sector. After the 
agrarian reform measures and nationalization of industries in the 1960s, 
followed by expansion of the public sector in the 1970s, no further measures 
were taken towards reducing the private sector role. Public sector expansion 
ceased after the mid 1980s while the private industrial sector grew since the 
1970s.  
Over the past decades, a private business class steadily gained 
momentum. The 1980s crisis and the socialist collapse was an occasion for 
this class to expand its activity and increase its power on the ground. A 
major part of the Syrian business community grew under government 
patronage and care. Another part was founded by the children of 
government officials and institutional leaders, and had therefore enjoyed 
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special privileges and influence. The growth of this business group created a 
lobbying interest advocating the market economy.  
Forces opposing reform 
The new circumstances and emerging forces created a powerful driving 
force towards economic reform. At the same time, the Syrian leadership is 
facing a number of difficulties and challenges in its reform effort. Most 
important among the obstalces to reform are the following: 
The Baath party institutionalized its etatist-populist ideology. Pursuant 
to the Constitution, Syria is "a socialist popular democratic state" (article 1, 
clause 1), and "the economy of the state is a planned socialist economy 
aimed at eliminating all forms of exploitation" (article 13, clause 1). In 
addition to the ideological implications of this orientation, the overall 
policies, developed since 1963 till 2000, and particularly after 1966, were 
designed to serve the alliance on which the Baath authority was built, 
embracing workers, farmers, low-incomers and revolutionary intellectuals 
under army leadership, and against "exploiting capital." The Baath party 
came to power through such ideological discourse and alliance, and it is not 
easy to change that ideology while keeping the same ruling groups in 
power. If the ruling authority said it was heading for a market economy and 
granting the private sector a leading role, with all the resulting policies and 
measures, it then would have to answer questions as to why it gave up the 
leading role of the public sector and social protection and what social 
implications would result from the new trend. These questions touch the 
very core of the historical alliance on which Baath power was based.  
Second, the hierarchal structure of the Baath state created a formidable 
obstacle to reform. The regime consisted of a number of overlapping 
hierarchical structures which yielded moral and material benefits for those 
assuming key positions within them. The leadership on top of the pyramid 
controls the state administrative apparatus through political organizations at 
the center, the regional level and the village level. These include the Baath 
party, the Federation of Workers' Unions, the Youth Union, the Farmers' 
Union, women’s and students associations, as well as the professional and 
scientific federations. Changing this system is likely to threaten the interests 
of those controlling these structures. What is even more important here is 
that no matter how powerful the Syrian Presidency is, it would still need this 
large network as a tool to maintain a firm grip on power. Loosing the 
support of these groups could undermine stability at a time when Syria is 
facing ongoing threats.  
Third, economic liberalization would considerably reduce the role of 
the public sector, thus depriving the state of its pivotal role, and turning it 
into an employer of a smaller number of workers that produce less 
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commodities and services, thus lowering the number of those with interests 
linked to the state. The state would lose a tool that played a vital role during 
economic and political crises and create fears of an uncontrollable capitalist 
economy. Reform is also facing opposition from the government 
bureaucracy that produced a bureaucratic bourgeoisie which amassed huge 
wealth and whose interests would be threatened by change. Although these 
persons often have turned into businessmen with an interest in opening the 
door for the private sector, they cannot afford to relinquish the use of the 
state apparatus as a tool to generate profits since they lack the qualifications 
to compete on a market free of state intervention.  
Reform is also facing opposition from the private sector which had 
emerged and developed under high protection against competition, creating 
an environment for lucrative gains at the expense of quality and consumer 
interests. Therefore, conservative and reform-opposing forces are not 
limited to the government and public sector; they exist in the private sector 
as well.   
Public fear of reform, which is linked in people’s minds to threats to  
already low living standards, and fear that the promised prosperity may 
never come, or only after years of deprivation and impoverishment, creates 
public anti-reform pressure. For example, there is a widespread fear of 
lifting the government subsidy for heating fuel (sold at SYP 7 = ca. 14 cents 
per liter), which explains the government reluctance over many years to take 
this decision. The government is afraid that reform could damage its public 
image, that it would be seen as betraying the poor to serve the rich, which is 
likely to expose larger groups of people to opposition discourses, 
particularly those of the Salafi groups in a country overwhelmed by an 
undeclared but obvious wave of religiosity. It is apparent that religiosity 
often places individuals at the threshold of extremism, especially in 
international circumstances plagued with double standards that inflame 
Muslims and persuade them of the 'obligation of Jihad'.  
There is also the threat of corruption which gives rise to the claim that 
the reform recipe is designed to serve the narrow personal interests of a 
parasitic bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Small groups close to the decision-
making circles have started to dominate wider areas of the most important 
and profitable sectors. This creates extensive complaints in the business 
community.  
The long distance Syria needs to travel in order to shift from the status 
quo towards a market economy creates additional difficulties due to the 
discrepancy between the adopted new mechanisms and the prevailing 
system. There is a contradiction between the centralized structure of the 
Syrian economy on one hand and capitalist market mechanisms on the 
other, making changes a formidable challenge and consequently the threats 
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of failure much greater. This is exacerbated by the lack of experience with 
regard to market mechanisms: the lack of local experts in market legislative 
and organizational structure who are capable of regulating the financial 
market, banking systems, free trade and shifting towards currency 
convertibility; the lack of sound knowledge on how to properly deal with 
transnational corporations and financial and trade institutions; inefficient 
marketing methods; underdeveloped business support institutions like 
research and consultancy centers, accounting and auditing firms and others; 
and, finally, the lack of reform leaders and cadres that could mobilize 
community forces behind the reform process.  
Finally, and by contrast to eastern European countries, which received 
tremendous support from Western Europe, Syria is undertaking the reform 
without international support. Furthermore, it is doing so under external 
threats and pressure which leaves the government more vulnerable to the 
negative consequences of this process. It also makes it more reluctant to 
abandon its control over the national economy and the business community. 
This translates to the government's slow and selective pursuing of reforms 
which makes it harder to sustain a proper balance between change and 
stability. 
The Syrian government’s reform strategy 
The difficult position of Syria and the conflict between pro and anti-market 
forces has made the Syrian leadership’s reform path appear confused, but it 
has made up its mind to proceed toward a market economy, without 
declaring this explicitly. It refrained from formulating a specific and written 
reform program in order to avoid opposition and paying the legitimacy costs 
among its historic constituency. Also, avoiding an explicit declaration of its 
plans gives it more flexibility in dealing with reform supporters and 
opponents. Its strategy was to incite discussion of reform without adopting a 
specific stand in order to gradually prepare attitudes to accept reform inside 
state and party circles. The government would take steady, incremental 
steps towards building a market economy, gradually allowing the private 
sector to take the initiative. Practically, there is an unwritten and undeclared 
reform program, which is materializing into a legislative and regulatory 
framework for a market economy. Five years after taking several early steps 
towards a market economy, the ruling Baath party openly said it would 
adopt “social market economy” during its 10th conference in June 2005. The 
Syrian government viewed this formula as consistent with the social roots of 
the Ba’th party as it had evolved toward a combination of the market and 
encouragement of private investment, but with social protection for the poor 
or victims of reform. Other than this no party authority has so far prepared 
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any document on the practical implications of a social market economy. 
Meanwhile, steps towards economic liberalization and building a liberal 
market economy continue unabated associated with a retreat of the state and 
the social insurance network. 
The implementation of reform 
In spite of the absence of a clear roadmap, Syria has made considerable 
strides towards completing various aspects of the market economy 
legislative, regulatory and institutional framework.  
Investment environment: Private investment promotion has been among 
the first tangible government measures since the mid-1980s. That approach 
initially tried to attract private investment through tax and other incentives 
but did not create a comprehensive investment-friendly environment. The 
first investment promotion legislations was Decision 186, of 1985, by the 
Supreme Council for Tourism encouraging tourist investment and 
implementing many related projects. Legislative Decree 10 of 1986 
provided an incentive for private and joint agricultural investments. A 
number of joint-ventures were set up under this law, but yielded 
insignificant results. Then Law 10 of 1991 offered tax and tariff exemptions 
as well as trade and exchange transaction facilitation. Many projects were 
authorized under this law, which covered the transport and industry sectors. 
Recently, Law 8 of 2007 replaced Law 10 of 1991, and Decree 9 of 2007 
created the Syrian Investment Commission. The new investment law 
reduced the tax ceiling from 36% to 27% and replaced the tax holiday of 5- 
7 years with a so-called “dynamic tax reduction,” depending on the legal 
form of the company, the number of employees, the region of investment, 
exports from the investment and others factors. All commodity and service 
sectors have been opened to Syrian and non-Syrian capital since the 
investment legislation does not discriminate between Syrian and non-Syria 
investors. On the other hand, the public sector has remained frozen and has 
not been privatized. 
Foreign Trade: The trade sector was the second to undergo early 
reforms with an easing of the government's control of trade. The state gave 
up its monopoly on imports of several commodities, leaving them entirely 
for the private sector or authorizing the private sector to import certain 
goods in return for a 2-4% commission, including cars, iron and timber. It 
also lifted absolute bans on import of a large number of items similar to 
locally produced subsidized goods, but continued high customs duties.1 
Generally speaking, however, customs duties were reduced, especially in 
regard to production inputs, which went down to 1%. 
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A major watershed was Syria’s signing of GAFTA in 1997, which 
opened Syrian markets to Arab manufactured products for the first time in 
decades. Syria also signed bilateral free trade agreements with the UAE in 
2000, Saudi Arabia in 2001, Iraq in 2001, and Jordan in 2002, in addition to 
similar agreements previously signed with Libya, Egypt and other countries. 
A free trade agreement concluded with Turkey came into effect in the 
beginning of 2007. Moreover, the government initialled a Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreement, although this was not finalized due 
to French opposition and US pressure. Syria also applied for WTO 
membership in 2001, but its request was not considered owing to US 
opposition. Despite that the Syrian Prime Minister issued Decision 1006 of 
2006 which set up a committee to prepare for WTO accession. 
However, the foreign trade sector remained de facto closed to non-
Syrian investments. Although there are no clear instructions prohibiting the 
establishment of import/export companies with non-Syrian capital, no such 
companies have been approved. Instead, natural and legal persons were 
allowed to act as agents for foreign companies, following a two and a half 
years ban on such a practice which, in any case, had been ineffective since 
foreign companies enlisted the assistance of undeclared agents which 
deprived the state coffers of revenues generated by such dealings. Syria 
joined a number of international agreements on protection of authorship and 
industrial intellectual property rights, patents, protection of technical and 
literary systems and international trademark registration. 
Foreign trade liberalization measures constituted an opportunity to 
expand private sector trade activity, in that it opened the Syrian markets for 
imports and represented a gradual reduction in tariff protection of the 
industrial sector. It did improve the investment climate. However, trade 
liberalization in recent years became a matter of controversy, reflective of 
the struggle between manufacturers and traders, and between consumer 
interests (although trade liberalization has actually raised prices) and 
workers who wish to preserve their jobs threatened by imports.  
Internal trade: Despite statist policy since the mid-1960s, government 
involvement in internal trade remained limited compared to the role of the 
private sector. It was limited to monopolies of certain ‘strategic’ 
commodities, notably oil products, cereals, cotton, iron, timber, cars and 
machinery. State-run cooperatives were set up for retail trading, but they 
had a small market share. However, the state began to gradually give up that 
role. More of a problem for traders was the issue of price controls which 
were based on profit margins. Government regulation of prices and its 
supply-monitoring has, however, eased since the mid-1990s. Law 42 of 
2006 on protecting the national economy from practices harmful to trade 
was issued to protect Syrian industry from unfair practices in international 
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trade, such as dumping and subsidies. Internal trade, particularly retail 
trading continued to be controlled by small and micro enterprises. No big 
companies or supermarket chains emerged. Only recently shopping malls 
began to appear in major cities. Until recently, non-Syrian investors were 
not in practice allowed to set up internal trading companies in Syria, 
although the law of commerce did not explicitly prevent it, and none have 
so far appeared. Recently, a modernized Law of Commerce No. 33 of 2007 
was issued and is expected to be followed by a corporate law, which will 
together replace the old Law 149 of 1949 and which explicitly authorizes 
non-Syrian trading companies. A consumer protection society was set up, 
but remained ineffective. The government has failed to effectively promote 
consumer cooperatives which suffer from bureaucratic interference.  
Monetary policy: Syria was in the mid-1950s one of the first countries 
to establish a Central Bank and had an advanced monetary policy compared 
to the neighboring countries. However, the state started to dominate the 
monetary institutions and placed the Central Bank under direct guardianship 
since the early days of the Syrian-Egyptian unity (1958-61). By the early 
1980s, the Central Bank and monetary policy were completely paralyzed. It 
gradually recovered since Law 23 of 2002 created the Monetary & Credit 
Council which granted the Central Bank a larger role in developing the 
country's monetary policy. The multiple Syrian pound exchange rates 
against foreign currencies were unified.  
Foreign trade financing rules used to be very complicated, and very 
often caused additional costs for traders. At present these instructions have 
been streamlined to a very large extent. Payment facilities were also offered 
with regard to current accounts to cover foreign trading. The so-called 
"export proceeds" rule, under which hard currency had to be earned through 
exporting in order to be able to finance imports, was abolished. Syrians now 
are allowed to open hard currency accounts. Interest rates were reduced 
after 20 years of fixed interest rates. Law 24 of 2005 allowed the 
establishment of money exchange companies and 5 companies were 
licensed by the end of 2007. Law 15 of 2007 regulated micro finance 
institutions. These changes contributed to increasing the hard currency 
supply in the local market, which helped stabilize the Syrian currency’s 
exchange rates. 
The Banking industry: After four decades of a government monopoly 
on banking, the sector was liberated. Private Banks Law 28 of 2001 was 
issued, and the first three private banks were founded in early 2004. By the 
end of 2007, the number of private banks in Syria had reached eight (two of 
which are Islamic banks) with 52 branches around the country, in addition 
to a number of new applications still under consideration. Under Law 29 of 
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2001 all banks were subject to banking confidentiality; Law 33 of 2005 on 
combating money laundering and financing terrorism was also passed.  
The private sector share of bank credits increased from 24% in 2000 to 
50% in 2005. Banking services in general improved, and the private 
banking sector contributed to offsetting the government banks' inability to 
meet the needs of the Syrian economy for modern banking systems. 
However, the capital of private banks remained limited and these banks 
have not expanded their activities on a large scale. Thus, the role played by 
the public sector in the domain of banking services continues to be 
dominant but, due to its antiquated operations and lack of proper salaries 
and incentives, it is expected to decrease with the further development of 
the private sector. The banking industry has not yet reached international 
standards and its contribution to investment financing is also limited. More 
time will be needed for such services to be elevated to the needed standards. 
The Insurance industry: Following four decades of nationalization and 
government monopoly on the insurance industry, Law 48 of 2004 created an 
Insurance Supervision Commission and Law 43 of 2005 allowed private 
insurance companies. 2005 witnessed the establishment of the first private 
insurance company and by the end of 2007 nine of them were operational. 
However, the insurance market in Syria is still limited, and insurance 
culture is underdeveloped. The state-run Syrian Insurance Company still 
possesses the lion's share of the insurance and insurance services market. 
Only after many years will an expanding insurance market be in operation. 
But by then, the Syrian Insurance Company will not be capable of 
competing with private insurance companies if it continues to operate 
without reforming work incentives.    
The financial sector: Law 22 of 2005 created the Syrian Commission 
for Financial Markets and Securities and, likewise, Law 55 of 2006 
established a stock exchange. This was followed by the Prime Ministerial 
Decision which regulates the transactions conducted by brokerage firms at 
the stock market, whose opening was delayed to 2008. The creation of the 
stock market is expected to improve the investment climate and provide 
better financing for development by expanding the ownership base. 
Establishing an effective stock market requires a number of still missing 
conditions, such as competent professionals to run the market, rewarding 
salaries, financial accounting, evaluation and brokerage companies, 
portfolio management as well as an effective and transparent judiciary that 
protects the rights of different parties and controls fraud and speculation that 
may harm smll investors. The new Law of Commerce as well as the long-
awaited Corporate Law were issued in March 2008, legalizing several types 
of trading companies, including leasing companies. The number of stock 
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companies in Syria is very small but these changes increased interest among 
private and family enterprises in changing into stock companies.  
Taxation: A series of steps were taken to reform the taxation system as 
a whole. A sales tax was implemented and scores of other taxes belonging 
to past decades were abolished. Law 61 of 2004 regulated the sales tax on a 
relatively large number of commodities. Law 41 of 2007 created the general 
authority of taxes and duties to handle tax policy design and follow up 
implementation. However, the reform of tax administration has not yet 
improved labor skills, raised salaries and incentives, upgraded office 
equipment and introduced IT in order to promote efficiency and combat 
corruption. Despite the issuance of Law 25 of 2003 on the combating of tax 
evasion, this legislation has remained ineffective, because the government 
did not pursuit serious enforcement and the private sector vehemently 
opposed it. Furthermore, the tax reforms have encouraged investment but 
were socially unfair, favoring major investors without providing minor 
investors with incentives.  
Efforts were also made to reform the tariff system and improve customs 
efficiency. Law 15 of 2001 exempted exports from taxes and duties. Export 
taxes were reduced twice within three years. Law 24 of 2003, Law 60 of 
2004 and Law 51 of 2006 were passed, with customs rates equal to or less 
than those of neighboring countries. Efforts to improve customs collections 
failed to achieve substantial successes: tariff evasion is still widespread and 
estimated customs revenues in 2006 budget did not exceed SYP 300 million 
while given the amount of imports it should have reached SYP 500 billion.  
Public Finance: No remarkable changes occurred in public finance. Oil 
revenues, though declining, continued to flow into the treasury. The share of 
corporate tax has not increased much as a result of tax reductions on one 
hand, and because of the widespread tax evasion practices on the other. 
Sales tax revenues increased, and state funds continued to subsidize some 
commodities, especially diesel oil fuel. The value of these subsidies is 
estimated at $2.5 billion (around 10% of GDP). However, budgetary deficit 
rates started to rise over the past two years, reaching about 4% of GDP. The 
2003 budget was issued with an approximate deficit of 33% (SYP 600 
billion expenditure vis-à-vis SYP 400 billion revenues). The government 
continued to borrow directly from the Central Bank and not through 
treasury bonds although Decree 60 of 2007 was issued to organize the 
issuance of treasury bonds and bills. Despite some technical improvements 
in budget development and treasury management, no radical changes were 
made especially with regard to implementing programs to enhance the 
efficiency of collection and expenditure. The budgeting process remained at 
the level of collection and expenditure of revenue without allowing fiscal 
policy to be used for macro-economic management.  
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Syria's indebtedness levels were reduced following the settlement of 
debts to Russia and other former socialist countries. The settlement of 
government obligations, including debt service, particularly to the World 
Bank also contributed to improving the situation. Foreign debt declined to 
17.2% of GDP by the end of 2007 compared to 23.3% in 2005  
Rental relationships: Four decades after the issuance of highly 
protective legislation regarding real estate and land tenancy that had 
negatively affected the construction industry and blocked major agricultural 
projects, Law 6 of 2001 on house rental and Law 56 of 2004 on agricultural 
relationships reduced protection for tenants and laid out new regulations to 
resolve old rental arrangements. Similar to lease legislation in many 
countries, favoring the strong (owners) at the expense of the weak (tenants), 
these laws have provided a favorable environment for large private 
investments in real-estate (both for housing and business purposes).  
Labor market policies: The Syrian labor policy was characterized by 
‘overprotection’ of workers after the issuance of Law 91 of 1959 and the 
state social employment policy since the 1960s. Syria has now adopted 
gradual labor market liberalization and signed a number of international 
agreements on labor legislation and child labor. It also created a small credit 
scheme under the 'Agency for Combating Unemployment' which was set up 
pursuant to Law 71 of 2001. It was followed by Decree 38 of 2006, which 
created the General Commission for Employment & Projects Development, 
to replace the ACU. In addition, a new labor law was drafted, which is 
expected to replace Law 91 of 1958, in order to improve labor market 
flexibility and enable employers to discharge employees upon payment of 
an indemnity. Labor unions, however, strongly opposed the new law and it 
was temporarily frozen but it is expected to be enacted in the end.  
The new policy is characterized by lifting the worker ‘over protection.’ 
This encourages investment, but there is still a need to activate the unions' 
role in the private sector. The trade union movement is very weak in this 
sector; given high unemployment levels, workers will remain under the total 
control of their employers who will be able to lower wages and privileges. 
Worker registration in the social security programs includes only 18.9% of 
private sector workers and they are registered with minimal salaries while 
all public sector workers are registered in accordance with the regulations 
and with full salaries. Pensions and end-of-service compensations are low 
compared to deductions that reach up to 24% of the worker’s salary. This 
creates a market imbalance in favor of employers, which the regulatory 
bodies are too weak to compensate for. Also, training and retraining 
programs aimed at promoting productivity are still limited.  
Education: Since the 1960s, the state nationalized education on the 
grounds that education plays a major role in raising generations on the 
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values of the revolution. Under reform, Decree 36 of 2001 allowed the 
private sector, both local and foreign, to invest in higher education. Today 
there are about 10 private universities, in addition to a number of 
applications for new ones under consideration. Pre-university education also 
witnessed large expansion in private schools (more than 500) providing 
quality education that excelled the public school level. A number of those 
private schools were affiliated with international educational institutions and 
adopted international curricula in addition to the obligatory Syrian syllabus. 
Those quality schools, being costly, were confined to children of wealthy 
people, and low income parents had no other alternative except sending 
their children to free public schools. This separation laid the foundation for 
social separation between quality education for the rich and lower quality 
for the poor. Some go further and call for reducing government expenditure 
on education and health. These changes threaten to sharply divide society 
into classes and reduce social mobility.  
Media: Since the 1960s, the state nationalized the media because 
information plays a major role in shaping allegiances. Gradual openness of 
the media and information sector started as of 2001. Legislative Decree 50 
of 2001 authorized publication of private weekly and monthly magazines 
and newspapers. At present, there are over 200 such publications in Syria, 
covering various subjects. Parties' newspapers were also allowed to be sold 
on the market. Political dailies were also allowed but have to follow 
convoluted methods of publication and distribution: the two authorized 
political dailies, namely Al-Watan and Al-Balad, are published in the 
Damascus free zone and require a daily distribution permit, just like foreign 
journals. Also, publication of those dailies was authorized to persons loyal 
to the ruling regime. Twelve commerical radio stations with no political 
inclinations were also allowed. Two private TV stations were launched in 
2007 and the private media is expected to expand, but under self-censorship.  
Advertising: with the nationalization of the media in the 1960s, 
advertising was also nationalized. Several advertising companies were 
issued permits to operate privately over the past years. These include 
advertising dailies, roadside advertising boards, specialized directories like 
Yellow Pages and Medical Pages etc. The advertising market is steadily 
expanding, although it is still lagging behind other countries in the region. 
The exhibitions industry has thrived since the mid-1990s. While previously 
the Damascus International Fair was the only annual event, held every year 
since 1955, today scores of private exhibition companies have emerged, and 
the private sector seems more interested in internal and foreign exhibitions. 
Advertisement activity constitutes a precondition for market and investment 
growth.  
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Real estate: Real estate rental laws have restrained the growth of this 
sector, which played a very limited role in the past years. It has now been 
considerably liberalized, especially when Gulf companies started a number 
of investment projects in Syria, such as the UAE construction company 
EMAAR and the Kuwait Kharai Company. Two Legislative Decrees (6 of 
2001 & 10 of 2006) liberalized the rental relationship between lessors and 
lessees. For the first time, Syrian companies began to invest in real estate, 
which, in turn, expanded the local construction materials industry and its 
imported inputs, and contributed to economic growth. Real estate prices and 
land prices have started to rise.  
Micro enterprises: Syria’s traditional policy was to support small and 
micro enterprises by restricting larger enterprises. One such example is the 
restrictions on the creation of car transport companies, which led to the 
passenger and goods transport sector being run by tens of thousands of 
individual owners. Similarly, the absence of chain supermarkets or shopping 
malls resulted in tens of thousand of shop owners sharing retail trade. Now 
with the change of economic policy towards large investment, small 
enterprises will face greater competition. The Agency for Combating 
Unemployment and non-profit organizations now offer support to this 
sector. Also, the government aims to further develop the spirit of initiative 
among the young generation, urging them to create their own businesses, 
given that the Syrians have a history dating back thousands of years during 
which they excelled as businessmen and traders. 
Privatization: Although Syria has not yet taken the privatization 
pathway, the public economic sector has not expanded since the mid-1980s. 
On the other hand, public-private partnerships (PPP) has been encouraged. 
The establishment of a paper mill in Deir Ezzor under a public-private 
partnership was a leading example. However, the private sector appears to 
be unenthusiastic about investing in the public sector. Furthermore, the 
government set up a number of committees for public sector reform, but 
failed to achieve any positive results. The attitude towards the public sector 
exemplifies the regime’s position toward reform in general, preserving its 
populist constituency and maintaining an instrument to intervene in 
economic life while also building a market economy. Thus, it preserves a 
fragile public sector without seeking any reforms which would threaten 
vested interests in the administration and among certain capitalist elements 
that are parasitic on the public sector. This results in large losses to the 
treasury and foregone economic growth for the national economy, despite 
the fact that public sector reform is possible and only needs the political 
will. 
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Consequences of economic reforms  
In the first seven years of President Bashar al-Assad’s term in office, 416 
Laws and 492 Legislative Decrees were issued, a majority of them 
concerning economic reform. This in itself is an indicator in the extent of 
change in the legislative and institutional framework. Notwithstanding the 
gap between legislative enactment and implementation, it is an indicator of 
coming big changes in Syria’s political economy. Despite the immaturity of 
the Syrian economic reform and its relative slowness, and despite the long 
way Syria still has to go in order to build a confident market economy in 
terms of legislative, regulatory and institutional structures, and despite the 
slow accumulation of know-how, the reforms have started Syria on an 
irrevocable pathway towards a market economy. We can assess the positive 
results by comparing Syria’s current situation with an assumed situation had 
the reforms not been started. In a time when oil production has been 
declining, growth rates would have been lower and unemployment levels 
higher; the value of the currency would have declined, and budget deficits 
and inflation increased. The changes are neither totally positive nor 
negative, however, and there are also many indicators of dangers ahead.  
Improved economic performance 
There has been a tangible improvement in the investment climate, and an 
increase in investment rates (25% of the GDP in 2006-08 compared to 17% 
in 2000-04). Moreover, more foreign investments have started to flow in, 
especially billions of dollars of Arab investment. EMAAR of the UAE 
announced a multi-billion investment project; other giant companies such as 
Bin Laden (Saudi Arabia), al-Khurafi (Kuwait) and al-Diyar (Qatar) have 
also started projects. Most investment from the Arab Gulf countires are in 
such real estate projects. This is the first time Syria experienced such an 
investment boom, largely as a result of the increase of oil prices. In 2007, 
Syria's share reached 9.9% of the total FDI in the Arab countries, as 
investments reached approximately $600 million in 2006 and $ 787 million 
in 2007, which is 6.5 times larger than in 2002. Syrian capital is starting to 
reinvest rather than export its profits, as was the case during the last four 
decades. This almost raised growth rates to double population growth, 
reaching 4.5% in 2005, 5.1% in 2006 and an estimated 6.5% in 2007 
compared to 0% in 2000 and -2.5 in 1999. Syria’s exports increased from $ 
5.6 billion in 2000 to $10 billion in 2006 and then to $ 12.4 billion in 2007 
despite the decrease in oil exports as increased oil prices compensated for 
decreased production. Imports reached $14 billion in 2007 and the trade 
deficit dropped to $500 million in 2006, which was compensated for by the 
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money transfers from Syrians working abroad; however, the trade deficit 
increased to $1.7 billion in 2007 (SYP 693 billion imports against SYP 615 
billion exports). Exports of traditional industries exceeded oil exports, after 
the latter had dominated exports for 15 years. Textile and garment exports 
increased to $3.5 billion, a significant indicator that Syria has alternatives to 
declining oil exports. As a result, unemployment levels dropped to 8.5% 
according to official statistics.2 Manufacturing industry (especially textile, 
food and pharmaceuticals) along with tourism proved to be important 
sectors, while the continuous growth of the pharmaceutical industry’s 
competitiveness and exports was particularly striking. The real estate sector, 
once small and lacking big operators, started to grow as several real estate 
companies were established with Syrian capital. This led to a boom in land 
prices, especially in Damascus, Aleppo and other governorate centers. The 
most important positive indicator of reform might be the improvement of 
the Syrian pound’s exchange rate against the American dollar (by the end of 
2007 1 $ = SYP 48 while it was SYP 52 in 2005). This indicates the high 
dollar market supply and the similarity between the official exchange rate 
and that of the black market. Foreign debt is low and Syria has high foreign 
reserves of over 60% of GDP. The balance of payments has at times been in 
surplus and the budget deficit is still manageable (the deficit without oil 
revenues is 10% compared to 15% with oil revenues in 2004). All this 
happened despite regional instability and American pressures.  
Economic performance since reform can be located in the wider context 
of Syria’s development since 1970. As the figure below indicates, Syria 
experienced two peaks of GDP growth, the first in the 1970s and the second 
in the first half of the nineties, both of which were partly owing to an influx 
of Arab financial aid and the expectation of a possible end to the war with 
Israel and improved relations with the West. The two troughs occurred in 
the 1980s and in the second half of the nineties when these positive factors 
disappeared.  The reform period, 2000--2008 is divided between the first 5 
years when the GDP growth rate was around 2%, less than population 
growth of 2.4%, and the period 2006 – 2008 when the average of GDP 
growth was around 5%.   
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Private sector growth  
Private companies have started to face greater competition pushing them to 
undertake self-restructuring, with a focus on modernizing their internal 
structure. This took the form of a wave of preparations to shift from family 
companies to joint stock companies and Decree 61 of 2007 was issued to 
facilitate this. Private companies also began to focus more on human 
resources and training, consultancy and improved auditing practices; they 
also started to prove their role in exports. In 2007, two large holding 
companies owned by Syrian businessmen, Alsham Holding Co. and Syria 
Holding Co., were established. Furthermore, the retail market has been 
modernized. Shops are now filled with a variety of goods, compared to the 
limited variety and low quality products that were available before the 
reforms. Shops now look better as compared to their hitherto shabby 
appearance and modern cafés and restaurants have sprung up. On the 
negative side, economic reform has focused on fiscal, financial and trade 
reform while industry and agiculture, which have been neglected, have 
suffered in the last few years. 
Social Impact 
The gap between rich and poor increased and social differences started to 
become more apparent after being hidden and limited. Society has started to 
divide into two main classes, one with access to better private education and 
healthcare, and better social welfare. Luxurious cars now cover the streets, 
and the rich have special markets separated from those where the poor shop. 
The second class consists of people that barely have access to public 
education and healthcare, or even to daily food. Richer people now brag 
about their wealth freely and the new generation is expressing its consumer 
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wants freely despite pressures from salafi religiosity. The media and 
communication networks, especially TV and the Internet, are playing a 
crucial role in integrating Syria into the global society with both its negative 
and positive impacts.  
Negative effects include price increases, which have started to damage 
the living standards of wider social categories; price rises have been 
absorbing all salary increases, despite the fact that state workers salaries 
have increased by 85% over five years (2001-2006) and subsequently 
affected the private sector salary levels. For instance, the price index 
increased by 10% in 2006 compared to 2005 according to the Central 
Bureau for Statistics, while salary levels remained unchanged. If we add 
housing costs to the goods and service basket of 2006, price increases will 
reach 17%, with those for 2007 even higher. The main reason behind these 
price increases is the international rise in the prices of oil, oil derivatives, 
petrochemical products and raw materials such as iron, timber, copper and 
aluminum as well as foodstuffs including wheat, barley and oils while 
wages and salaries remained the same in both the private and public sector 
during 2006 and 2007. Salary levels in both public and private sectors are 
not enough for a descent life for most workers. 
The resentment of the poor could be clearly heard but in private since 
public demonstrations are banned in the country. The UNDP poverty report 
shows that in 2003-2004 around 2 million people (11% of the population) 
lacked access to basic food and nonfood requirements. Using another 
poverty line, the overall proportion of people in poverty was at 30%, 
including 5.3 million persons. If this survey had been conducted in 2008, 
poverty rates would have been higher still. In order to face this situation, the 
state is seeking to preserve some components of the previous social security 
network, but it failed to develop new techniques for preventing sharp social 
polarization. Syria used to have a social pyramid characterized by a wide 
base, a big middle stratum and a low peak; under economic reform, the 
middle strata are shrinking while a rich stratum is emerging at the top, 
resulting in a social pyramid with a broad base, a narrowing middle stratum 
and a higher peak. 
Changing roles: government, private sector, and civil society 
A clear change is being witnessed especially on the economic level as the 
private sector is becoming the major contributor to GDP, by 65% according 
to official figures and more than 70% according to some estimates. It is also 
becoming the major employer as approximately 75% of the labor force in 
Syria work in the private sector, which dominates most of the economic 
sectors. The role of the state economic sector is decreasing, suffering from 
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increasing problems and manifest in shrinking state involvement in the 
economy. The political role of the private sector outside official frameworks 
is growing. Private sector influence is gradually extending to the education 
and information sectors, two major sectors in forming public opinion, social 
values and loyalty. Businessmen are sponsoring sport clubs that had been 
under government control since the 1970s due to the fact that they were 
places for public gathering. The private sector's ability to mobilize the 
forces of the civil society is rising after the degradation suffered by public 
secondary associations, with the result that society’s primordial bonds like 
family, sect and religion have increased in saliency which has come to 
supercede loyalty to the country for many social categories. This change is 
reflected in the increased ability of capitalists and tribal leaders to get their 
representatives elected as members at the parliament and local 
administration councils; indeed, were these conducted on a transparent basis 
without state intervention their impact would be dominant. 
What remains to be done?  
It is difficult to answer this question because there is no ready-made 
blueprint for reform or for a market economy since it differs from country to 
country and the government has not laid down clear targets. However, it is 
clear that Syria still has a very long way to go during the next years to reach 
its formal goal of a “social market economy.” One can identify general 
economic objectives, such as increased competitiveness on international 
markets, higher productivity, and value added, all of which are at a low 
level in Syria, and indicate legislative, regulatory and institutional reforms 
needed to advance these objectives. We will introduce here the main issues 
that the economic reform program is still to tackle. 
Decision-making and implementation 
Economic decision-making is a cornerstone of any reform process but it is 
still facing a twofold problem. In its technical aspect, decision-making still 
lacks competence, regular procedures and quality information. There is also 
a need to draw a roadmap specifying the reform steps, timing and 
requirements. In its political aspect the Baath Party is still controlling not 
only strategic decisions but intervenes in the smallest detail such as 
appointing a manager in a remote department. It is crucially important to 
activate community monitoring in different forms to guarantee that the 
reform process is on the right track and serves the public interest rather than 
vested interests which are increasingly shaping the reform agenda. No 
significant progress has been made in administrative reform despite the 
30    The Road to Economic Reform in Syria 
creation of a new portfolio, Ministry of State for Administrative 
Development in March 2000, which remains without a structure or 
resources. In the next cabinet, its importance decreased instead of 
increasing. The government has taken several steps to ease centralization 
and delegate authority to governors and local bodies, simplify procedures 
and focus on training and selection methods but this has yielded no tangible 
improvement in government efficiency. The judicial system also needs 
reform, for a market economy cannot be built without a mechanism to 
ensure rule of law and contract enforcement.  
Combating corruption 
Individuals and investors are still complaining about pervasive corruption. 
Transparency International’s corruption index shows that corruption 
indicators in Syria actually deteriorated (see table 1.1). As Syria’s global 
ranking indicates, in 2003-2004 Syria was around the world average, while 
in 2005 and 2006 its ranking fell. 
Table 1.1: Transparency International Corruption Index:  
Syria 2003 - 2005 
Total 
Score 
Confidence 
Range 
CPI 
Score 
Country 
rank Year 
163 3 2.9 93 2006 
158 3 2.9 93 2005 
145 2.8 3.4 71 2004 
133 1.3 3.4 69 2003 
 
Combating corruption is one of the most important economic, social 
and political issues. It represents a condition for raising administrative 
efficiency and creating an attractive investment climate as well as for the 
best use of national wealth, political legitimacy and political reputation. A 
comprehensive program for combating corruption that involves all social 
categories is still to be initiated. 
The private sector and the investment climate 
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The private sector has enjoyed protection from one side and suffered from 
many pressures from the other, as many private firms’ characteristics do not 
go well with open markets. Private businesses are dominated by small, 
family enterprises that lack modern corporate structure and work methods; 
they do not disclose their information. High protectionism has ensured them 
guaranteed profits with almost no competition while open markets require 
competitiveness; over-regulation and pervasive corruption within the 
government bureaucracy have made this sector used to corrupt activities. 
Furthermore, business services still require much development. 
Management consulting is still at its primary stages, and so are auditing 
services. Moreover, the introduction and application of international 
accounting standards and disclosure practices are still very weak; the 
production of sufficient, comprehensive and timely information still needs 
much effort; and their internet services are still inefficient and plagued with 
troubles. Some private companies have become aware of this situation and 
began taking action in the right direction, but this is not a wide, well-
coordinated movement within a comprehensive private sector reform 
program. This would be the task of the government and other private sector 
agencies such as the chambers of commerce and industry. Here it is 
especially important to launch an industrial modernization program because 
industry is the sector facing the hardest competition as Syria moves toward 
a market economy. 
The World Bank study on investment climate in Syria, conducted in 
2005, indicates that the investment climate in Syria is still suffering from 
many weaknesses that limit investment attractiveness and product 
competitiveness.3 The report was based on a field survey that included 448 
small firms with less than 50 workers, 81 intermediate facilities with 51 – 
150 workers and 25 large facilities with more than 150 workers. Main 
conclusions of the study were that, while Syrians’ business initiative and 
talents were highly evaluated, electricity supply, corruption, business 
licenses and unfair competition issues constituted, according to 40% of the 
surveyed companies, strong or even severe obstacles to investment. 
Problems noted with the administration included the unpredictability of 
taxes that might be imposed by the tax administration, and over-regulation, 
with businesses subjected to around 25 inspections by municipality, police, 
social security and tax officers who often extract bribes and consume time 
and energy of the management. Syria has the slowest judiciary in the region: 
only 1% of the surveyed respondents had resolved their commercial 
conflicts in courts over the last 3 years. Bureaucratic procedures for 
initiating businesses were highly complex and investor protection low. 
Another set of problems is related to labor. Workers' low productivity 
makes labor costs higher compared to output than in many countries; Syrian 
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workers' education level is considerably lower than in other countries and 
the worker discharge difficulty indicator is higher than the average rate of 
MENA. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor drafted a new law to 
replace Law 90 of 1959, known for its inflexibility as regards the 
employer’s right to discharge employees, which would give the employer 
the right to dismiss the worker in return for compensation up to threefold 
the monthly salary for each service year. However, this law faced fierce 
opposition from the Workers’ Unions, delaying its issuance. In agriculture, 
land reform legislation still stipulates low limits for agricultural property, 
leading to the absence of developed capitalist agriculture, and to the 
fragmentation of land property among a great number of small farmers.  
Another set of problems concern financing. Relatively few Syrian 
companies - only 12% of the surveyed companies - received financing from 
banks. Banks provided only 12% of the working capital and 4% of the total 
investment to the companies in the study. The average required collateral 
demanded by banks came to 217% of the loan value, one of the highest 
measured in ICA surveys. The monetary sector is still lacking the long-
awaited stock market, investment guarantee institutions, financial services 
establishments, and the full convertibility of the Syrian pound. Moreover, 
capital inflows/outflows are still restricted; investment banks are absent; the 
payment system is still very inefficient with cash payment covering 90% of 
the private sector transactions; the informal private sector is estimated to be 
handling around 40% of market transactions; credit/debit cards are still 
absent and public banks services are still backward; the Central Bank’s 
ability to supervise other banks is limited; and capital leasing firms are still 
absent in the country.  
The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
indicated that Syria's economy is behind a number of economies in the 
region such as Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia. The minimum amount of required 
capital to form a company is six times more than the regional average. As 
regards investment promotion activity, the investment development agency 
lacks a plan to direct investments towards the most important sectors; 
provides insufficient information for the investor to decide on investment 
feasibility; and lacks sufficient promotion and marketing to attract investors. 
Public sector reform  
Syria has not chosen the privatization option and the government is still 
calling for public sector reform. However, despite the creation of several 
committees since 2001, no step has been taken in this regard, and the public 
sector is still suffering major losses when subsidies for oil products are 
deducted from profits. Even if the government wants to maintain its 
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interventionary role in investment and job creation, this requires a public 
sector working with financial and administrative autonomy in coherence 
with market mechanisms. It also requires selecting specific investment 
sectors with strategic importance where the public sector can efficiently 
compete and withdrawing from other sectors to enable the private sector to 
compete in an open market. At present, the state monopolizes the 
manufacturing industry in fields such as tobacco, beer, mineral water and 
electricity distribution as well as trade in certain products such as oil 
derivatives, wheat, cotton and sugar beet. It intervenes in the trade of other 
products such as iron, wood and cars and imposes a 2-42% commission for 
allowing merchants to import such items without providing any services.  
Conclusion  
Syria has taken impressive, probably irreversible, strides toward a market 
economy; indeed the political struggle for reform appears to have been won. 
But Syria has still a long way to go before its reforms are fully implemented 
and a healthy market economy is in operation. Moreover, it is by no means 
certain that the ideal of creating a social market economy will be realized, 
for there are indeed signs that the outcome will be little different from the 
kind of unregulated capitalism prescribed by neo-liberalism. The following 
essay takes up this question. 
  
                                                
1 Many importers resorted to fraudulent practices to evade customs duty, 
such as tampering with the value included in the invoices of imported goods, or 
importing these goods via an Arab country with an Arab certificate of origin, or 
even cross-border smuggling. 
2 Economic experts are sceptical about this percentage for several reasons: 
the unemployment rate was 16% in 2003 according to a sample survey 
conducted by the Agency for Combating Unemployment; the rates of new 
entrants into the labor market is still high; the Syrian Government has lowered 
employment in the public sector; and around 200,000 to 300,000 workers 
returned to Syria from Lebanon in 2005. 
3 World Bank: "Syrian Investment Climate Assessment. Unlocking 
potential of the private sector,” June 8, 2005. 
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A Model for a Social Market  
Economy in Syria 
Samir Seifan 
Introduction 
Even as Syria seeks to move toward a market economy, the capitalist world 
economy has entered a deep structural crisis the costs of which the public, in 
the first place, has paid and will pay. The domination of the extreme neo-
liberal ideology generated an unprecedented liberalization of the world 
financial markets. Speculative rent-based activities increased at the expense 
of the real economy (production of goods and services). The role of the state 
regressed and its regulation of markets loosened, resulting in a “thin” state 
which was, more than ever before, a tool in the hands of the business 
community; presidents became business promoters and transaction 
marketers. The social aspect declined and laborers lost many of the 
privileges that they had gained over long decades of struggling.  Since the 
world economy depends on the dollar and other hard currencies, the 
business practices and crises in the core capitalist economies, especially the 
US, affect the whole world. As the USA issues more banknotes to cover its 
budget deficit, the entire world will pay for it. Nobody yet knows how far 
the rules of the world economy will change as a result of the crisis; there is 
no alternative to capitalism but neo-liberalism may retreat and newer state-
centric economic models, such as that of China, become more attractive. 
Hence, just as the Syrian government seemingly opted for a market 
economy, this model has become more contentious, and alternative mixed 
models enjoy more credibility. The question is whether Syria can steer an 
economic reform path to a social market economy that enjoys the benefits of 
a market while avoiding the costs of an unregulated neo-liberal one.  
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Syria in the context of economic debates 
The Syrian dilemma  
For about 35 years, Syria followed economic polices modeled on the Soviet 
experience, but after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the Syrian 
government started hesitatingly moving towards the market economy. This 
hesitation reflected a conflict between its advocates and opponents and fear 
of the consequences of uncontrolled market mechanisms. Thus, in 2000, 
when President Bashar al-Assad took power, Syria adopted a slow 
experimental approach of change without formulating this approach in any 
document. The 10th Conference of the Arab Baath Socialist Party (June, 
2005) officially adopted the Social Market Economy that in principle 
combines a market with social protections. But the party did not issue any 
document to explain the content of this model and Syria started transition 
from a state-run economy to a market economy without any methodology or 
guidelines measuring success or failure, nor mechanisms to take corrective 
actions.  
This gave rise to different opinions about this choice. Some believed 
that a social market economy would not work because it needs a rich 
country (like Germany) to bear the costs. Others supported the new 
approach but called for staged implementation: first introducing a market 
economy in order to achieve growth and then the social aspects once growth 
had been achieved. The documents of the State Planning Commission seem 
to advocate such a market-first vision. A third party called for 
simultaneously combining the market with social aspects and a fourth party 
looked at this approach as a mere continuation of the old Ba’thist statist-
populist model in new attire. The common point running through the debate 
was the ambiguity of the meaning of the social market model.  
Meanwhile, in practice, step-by-step transition has already started 
toward a liberal market economy, and while the slow pace of transition may 
have concealed the impact on social welfare so far, this is bound to be 
negatively affected. The transition towards a market economy has achieved 
some positive results including increased investment and higher economic 
growth rates, but its socioeconomic effects have also started to appear, 
especially the negative impact on industry where once exporting 
industrialists have become importers, while the increased costs of living and 
deteriorating living standards of most Syrians has aggravated poverty. The 
poverty report on Syria issued by the UNDP states that "at the national 
level, well-off individuals (above the third tenth of expenditure distribution) 
have benefited from the economic growth more than the poor have" and that 
poverty "in general exists in rural areas (62%) more than in urban areas". 
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The UNDP reports also show that Syria's index of social development is 
declining, especially since the late 1990s. The increasing poverty and 
declining social index despite economic growth is reflected in the widening 
wealth distribution gap: the Gini index of inequality has increased in Syria 
between 1997 and 2004 from 0.33 to 0.37.  
This is unjust from the perspective of socioeconomic democracy, and 
most Syrians will not accept an economic system that causes deterioration 
in their standards of living while a small minority owns the majority of the 
nation's wealth. Moreover, such a model would not be sustainable and 
would lead to increasing crime and social unrest. Efforts to avoid 
confronting social problems do not serve the cause of real economic growth. 
The origins of the social market idea 
Though the economic model to be proposed in this study is labeled a "social 
market economy" it does not only take the original German social market 
economy as its reference but benefits from the experiences of both Western 
and Eastern Europe, as well as Third World countries. It also takes the 
Syrian reality into account on the grounds that the economic model in any 
country is drawn to fit the socioeconomic geography of the country.  
There are three essential reasons for not wholly adopting the German 
model as a reference: First, it is no more than an organized liberal market 
economy, based, as Dr. Issam Azzam said,1 on "a difficult compromise that 
was realized in historically [specific]  circumstances…in which… 
capitalism…[had to] to make significant cessions to the working class 
….establishing a socioeconomic contract between laborers and employers 
under the state's supervision…[permitted by] the high level of economic 
development, which allowed dividing the economic surplus between the 
laborers and the employers; …and aimed at avoiding the threat of 
communism…which meant adopting platforms that took many things from 
communism."  However, this model has been regressing in Western Europe 
since the liberal attack on the "welfare state" and with the collapse of the 
international socialist system, the capital countries have needed to pay less 
attention to social issues, notably equality. Also, the USA, working to 
impose its economic hegemony through opening of markets and unleashing 
competition, obliged the social market countries to diminish social security 
networks and the welfare state in order to reduce costs and increase their 
competitiveness, making it difficult for a single country to impose high 
taxes that would affect its competitiveness in an open market. This situation 
lessens the applicability of the previous forms of the social market 
economy. Moreover, the German European model has not paid attention to 
the central social issue in any socioeconomic structure, namely the 
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"ownership of the means of production". It has not included the principle of 
expanding the basis of property ownership, or developing the role of 
participatory social property forms, and has been limited, basically, to the 
concept of concentrated corporate capitalist property which does not benefit 
most people in any given society. "Expanding the basis of property" does 
not mean expanding state property but rather the basis of individual 
ownership, even if in small properties. The number of owners and the 
property hierarchy are major criteria of social equity in any society (How 
many owners are there? How much do they own out of the total property 
values? And how are the categories of owners distributed?). While it is true 
that the German model has given good results in Germany due to high 
productivity and economic growth, this is not the situation in the developing 
countries including Syria where the ability to assume the costs of traditional 
forms of the social market economy is declining in today's open economy. 
The debate over economic production and income distribution 
The discussion of a social market economy provoked a lot of debate because 
social expenditure is a direct deduction from the national income (in 
Germany about 27% of the GDP is spent on social aspects). Neo-liberals 
argue that a deduction for social purposes that exceeds the capability of the 
economy will be at the expense of productive investment; this will weaken 
future growth, hence negatively affecting future investment and social 
expenditure. Conversely, they argue, maximizing investment will propel 
growth and increase the total of social expenditure, even if its proportion of 
national income remains limited, if not in the short term, over the long term. 
For neo-liberals, the social aspect is a byproduct and priority should be 
given to motivating investment, individual initiative and profits. This 
argument has its resonance in Syria, not only within the business 
community, but among governmental decision-makers2 as well, who accept 
that social expenditure overburdens growth and drives investment away, and 
that we should postpone it in order to give private investment the 
opportunity to flourish freely without constraints. Only by realizing growth 
and enlarging the cake can one allocate a higher ratio for social expenditure. 
Moreover, for neo-liberals, a productive capitalist who reinvests his money 
to expand his/her business is much better than a government official who 
misuses his/her power to self enrich through corruption and wastes public 
money carelessly; the first realizes growth and benefit for others, while the 
second realizes his pleasures and causes harm to others.  
Socialists, by contrast, argue for the importance of equitable social 
distribution from the fact that the economic growth of developed societies 
has been associated for many decades with a continuous improvement in the 
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their wealth distribution and working conditions which, in turn, created a 
better climate for productivity to grow. Social expenditure is investment in 
human capital that contributes to health, education and qualifications needed 
for economic growth but market mechanisms alone limit this to richer 
groups and deprive the majority. Under a market economy, all contribute to 
income production, but productive property is monopolized by a few. 
Furthermore, producing goods and services is not an end by itself, but is to 
satisfy the needs of the people as a whole; postponing distribution traps the 
majority of people in poverty. If it is necessary to diminish consumption this 
should include everyone, not exempting the rich who consume wastefully. 
Finally, socialists would reject the argument that capitalists are necessarily 
productive and government necessarily parasitic. 
The dictates of globalization 
This theoretical debate has to be put in the current context, where 
international financial institutions, governments and economists tend to 
assume an inverse relation between the level of social protection and the 
competitiveness of open economies. Overcoming this contradiction and 
achieving both a high level of social protection and competitiveness is 
possible but it requires a high level of productivity and industries with 
higher added value, which allows for both higher wages and higher profits. 
This is the strength of the developed economies, which can do without low 
value-added sectors requiring intensive labor and focus on the sectors 
requiring intensive capital and high technology. Moreover, they also 
monopolize intellectual property rights and scientific research, thus putting 
high valued added industries out of the reach of the Third World countries, 
which allows them to impose high prices and profits of their products. 
The world market with its flows of capital and goods limits the capacity 
of individual countries, especially small ones, to adopt policies that differ 
from the prevailing neo-liberal practices because this would isolate them. 
For example, it is not easy to apply a strong protection policy, or to adopt a 
restricted monetary system and impose high income taxes. On the other 
hand, adopting the neo-liberal model proved not to be the good choice, as 
the current crisis illustrates. However, when we get beyond the dominant 
discourses and closely analyze economic policies applied throughout the 
world we find that there are significant differences and other options are 
available. Based on that, we believe that the social market economy has 
sound foundations and principles and that they are applicable under the 
prevailing global conditions and can secure both economic growth and a 
fairer distribution of wealth for Syria. 
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Foundations of the model for a social market economy in Syria 
Syria needs to formulate a clear strategy of its socioeconomic orientation 
and it should not let this be dictated by neo-liberal pressures. An effort is 
needed to formulate a model of the economy it aims for and the role of the 
state in this political economy. The model to be proposed here is not a 
mathematical model where the researcher enters the inputs to get certain 
results and to see the impacts of probabilities, assumptions, etc. Such 
models are merely an aid to analysis and are misused by some to claim 
absolute objectivity of analysis in order to exclude social aspects. Rather, 
the model entails laying out, on the basis of general principles, a strategy 
that would be able to realize balanced economic and social growth. The 
social market economy is based on the following principles. 
The principle of the market economy 
No economy today can exist outside of the market, but there is not one 
single model of a market economy in the past or at present. We believe that 
the social market economy should rest on the foundation of a market, which, 
in turn, stands on private property of the means of production, and freedom 
of entering and exiting the market, together with policies to enhance 
competition and combat monopoly. In addition, it needs a pricing 
mechanism based on supply/demand; it needs to develop initiative spirit, 
freedom of decision for economic institutions, and systems of values 
suitable for market economy.  
At the same time, however, the market should not be left without 
government intervention, using soft administrative and financial tools, since 
a market without controls creates economic crises and wealth polarization, 
especially with the recently growing global trend to financial speculation. 
The social market economy is not a mere market economy, but is based on 
market forces that are controlled by effective political and social measures 
aiming at sustainable economic growth and better income distribution. It 
entails developing a set of policies that work with the principles of market 
economy, allowing market dynamics to stimulate economic growth. A 
social economy needs two legs to walk on: the first one is economic growth, 
which enlarges the cake, and the second is fair distribution. Only 
productivity will ensure success in the end. This is what we have learned 
from the collapsed socialist experience. Rigidity and failure to grow and 
keep up with the changes in the capitalist system brought collapse. 
The social market model also focuses on integrating income 
distribution into the production process since this is not an automatic 
byproduct of the market. Thus, the model entails fair wage policies and 
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income re-distribution policies that correct market imbalances. This model 
also depends on expanding the basis of property to include the broadest 
sector of people through individual private properties, collective private 
properties (collectives, associations or groups), small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), and non-monopolistic stock companies. This model 
does not expand state property, but keeps it to the necessary minimum. This 
has nothing to do with the totalitarian state which monopolizes the 
economic activities and prevents, or hinders, individual and collective 
initiatives. But it does depend on a limited interventional role by the state 
through the legislation of a regulatory structure. Thus, all policies should 
have these two sides, and should hinder neither growth and production nor 
equity of income distribution. 
The principle of the “smart state”  
The need to redefine the role of the state is an urgent issue in Syria. All 
societies have to find a proper role for the state and for Syria neither an 
excessively totalitarian model nor the excessively weak neo-liberal state, 
nor one captured by narrow special interests are appropriate. A proper role 
for the state and especially its control of society is not easily devised: 
excessively tight controls suffocate society, excessively loose ones could 
lead to anarchy, but up to this point, control in Syria remains too strong and 
more freedom is needed. 
Since independence, the Syrian state adopted a relatively high level of 
economic intervention. It followed a policy of protective tariffs to 
encourage national industry. With the Syrian-Egyptian Unity, the state 
started to play a central role in the economic, political and social life, a role 
which was strengthened after 1963. The state assumed direct control over a 
major part of the economic activity and production and had a great influence 
on the rest by its excessive interference in economic activity. It restricted 
private investment, monopolized investment of many sectors and controlled 
media and advertisement. It undertook provision of many free services such 
as education and health, and some commodities and services were delivered 
at subsidized prices such as bread, tea, rice, sugar, electricity, water and 
fuels. It imposed exorbitant tax rates on profits. By and large, it had direct 
control on a huge part of income and income distribution, following policies 
that aimed at income redistribution,  
Today, the State is radically changing its economic role; the public 
sector has been frozen; investment liberalized; the market opened for local 
and foreign investment; trade liberalized, and many state-monopolies given 
up, such as foreign trade, banking, insurance, media and advertisement 
which have been liberalized; and the rental relation between owners and 
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tenants in the real estate sector and in agricultural lands modified. The state 
is gradually relinquishing its price subsidization policy. It is reducing taxes 
by transferring the tax burden from the producer to the consumer/citizen. 
This transformation is taking place piecemeal and covertly without 
debating a new definition of the role of the state, leading to the de facto 
assumption of the neo-liberal idea of the state’s role by default, with hugely 
negative consequences for social equity and the development process as a 
whole. The liberal model represents the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism, 
which is not the suitable model for a state like Syria for many reasons; 
rather, the model of the intervening state within the market economy 
remains the most suitable one for Syria. Liberals claim that market economy 
policies are neutral and of technical rather than social nature but we believe 
that the liberal market is socially not only unfair, but extremely unfair; it 
leads to the accumulation of wealth in few hands and to monopoly. 
Therefore, selective state intervention which does not contradict the general 
principles of market economy becomes a necessity; as an example, it is 
known that the absolute freedom of competitiveness leads to monopoly; 
therefore, all countries set legislation to protect competition and prevent 
monopoly. For the role of the state to be effective, it should be “smart” and 
include the following main aspects: 
1. The role of the state as an organizer i.e. to create the legal, 
organizational and institutional environment for economic activity, 
including its intervention to correct market deviations and socioeconomic 
malfunctions using monetary, financial and commercial tools. This includes 
planning to create an investment promoting environment and an effective 
policy to support industry and develop technology. 
2. The state’s role as a arbiter among society’s classes and groups to 
keep the social balance and correct social deformations created by the 
market, including preventing property and wealth polarization, encouraging 
the expansion of the property basis and income distribution through e.g. 
progressive taxation, social security and encouragement of trade unions.  
3. Its role as a complementary investor: while the main body of the 
economy is in the hand of an individual and collective private sector, the 
state would still make strategic investments that the private/civil sector 
refrain from, invest in neglected sectors or regions, and correct 
supply/demand imbalances. Thus, it would enhance competition and prevent 
monopoly, but according to uniform principles and rules without privileging 
some. This role might take the form of pure government companies or joint 
ventures with the private sector. These state investments should be run not 
by the Ministry of Finance, but by (a) government holding company(ies) 
that operate(s) according to rules of market as it is the case all over the 
world (this is a call to reform the public sector not to privatize it).  
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4. The state's role is central in establishing the physical and social 
infrastructure for socioeconomic activity, which includes public utilities, 
roads, bridges, canals, dams, and other public facilities. In addition, this 
includes spending on education and health, which should be provided freely 
at all levels or with low fees for limited-income people, in order to prevent 
polarization in society. 
The principle of fair macroeconomic policies: 
Treasury policies regarding both revenues and expenditure differentially 
benefit social groups. Neo-liberal-inspired reforms in state policy are an 
immediate threat to the realization of a social market economy. In the past, 
Syria used to get a large part of its revenues from petroleum income which 
was redistributed for the good of a wide range of people in society, notably 
through subsidies. Today, petroleum income is declining and state income 
from its financial and commercial enterprises will also decline as the private 
sector acquires a growing part of this market. State income may also decline 
because of the reduction in tax rates on capital. Thus, the solution that may 
be adopted will be to abandon the policy of subsidies which would have a 
huge negative effect on the standards of living of a wide sector of citizens. 
Moreover, the Syrian government in the future could be forced to reduce 
further its education and health expenditures, which, if it happens, would 
have huge negative social impacts but also a negative effect on economic 
growth. This dilemma is the main direct threat to the whole idea of a social 
market economy and has to be addressed.  
Tax policies have become an issue which risks determining by default 
Syria’s model of development. Until 1992, punitive taxation on profits 
exceeding SYP 700,000 reached 92%, which became a pretext for tax 
evasion. Those rates have been reduced gradually until they reached now a 
minimum of 14% for stock companies that offer more than half of their 
stocks for public underwriting, and a maximum of 28%. This is very low by 
all international standards. Nevertheless, tax evasion is still very common 
and the contribution of direct taxes on real profits is still low. At the same 
time Syria is following neo-liberal practices which levy taxes on consumers 
rather than on profit making producers, that is to say, it is reducing the profit 
tax and replacing it partially by sales tax / VAT, and it decreases customs 
duties, which protect local products from imports.  
Tax policy lacks a clear strategy and has to focus on combating tax 
evasion, particularly by large capital. It is incomprehensible that the 
government has not paralleled the drastic reduction in tax rates with 
increased combating of tax evasion including widespread customs evasion 
and smuggling. These practices deprive the treasury of significant resources, 
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and would force the government to take further actions that hurt social 
equity.  
Neo-liberal ideology shows a clear schizophrenic attitude to any price 
subsidization and protection. All evils are attributed to subsidies in the name 
of realizing a balanced budget; yet neo-liberal states themselves widely 
subsidize and protect their agriculture from foreign imports. Moreover, the 
pundits of liberalism have no effective solutions to the negative 
consequences of eliminating subsidies. In the past, Syria applied 
administrative pricing for socioeconomic development reasons, i.e. 
subsidizing education, health, culture and sport, as it is an investment in 
human capital to produce a qualified able-bodied labor force. For social and 
political reasons it also subsidized basic commodities like bread, rice, sugar, 
oil, electricity and fuels. There were economic reasons, too, for subsidizing 
energy and agriculture. And some subsidies benefited vulnerable people or 
those with special needs. Thus, the subsidization policy had multiple 
objectives and entirely relinquishing it is neither easy nor justified. Rather 
what is needed is an integrated strategy to diminish unnecessary or 
unjustified subsidies, while targeting continued subsidies more effectively. 
This would reduce waste while putting in place social safety nets. 
 
The principle of expanding the productivity of the Syrian economy 
Furthermore, a market requires establishing a regulatory and institutional 
structure and must be governed by macro-economic policies to foster 
growth. Designing and modeling such a policy should be based on field 
surveys assessing Syria’s physical and human resources along with natural 
and technological resources. The policy should identify priority sectors that 
impact on growth in terms of increasing accumulation and strengthening the 
infrastructure of the Syrian economy, hence guaranteeing sustainable 
development. This means, first of all, developing a package of monetary, 
financial and commercial policies to encourage the development of these 
different sectors. Secondly, the establishment of a number of locomotive 
projects and programs that promote economic and social development such 
as technological parks and private economic zones hosting high-potential 
industries like the textile city, agrofood city, and software city, which aim at 
developing these industries and increasing their added value. These policies 
should be part of a long-term development program divided into three broad 
stages, each lasting a period of 7 years and preparing the ground for the 
following stage through expanding the production base horizontally 
(number of enterprises, investment volume, and number of employees) and 
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vertically (value-added, capital-intensive and high-tech goods and services, 
and more a educated and trained workforce). 
The preparation phase (7 years) 
During this stage the focus should be on enhancing traditional industries 
(for example: food, textile, and assembly line industries, which may be the 
base for more sophisticated industries) as well as on tourism, transport and 
transit trade; education and training, and export of skilled labor to Arab oil 
countries. There should be integration between industries using local inputs 
and those using imported inputs as well as between those satisfying local 
demands and those intended for export. More advanced mechanical, 
electrical and chemical industries should occupy the second place while the 
third place should be for pioneer industries such as electronic and 
knowledge-based industries. Each industry should contribute to the general 
economic goals for this stage: realizing savings at more than 25% of GDP; 
reducing capital flight; investments levels exceeding 25% of GDP from 
local sources and FDI; an estimated growth rate of 6-7%; lowering the 
population growth rate from 2.5% to 2% and the unemployment rate below 
10%; attaining a low budget deficit not exceeding 7%; and lower inflation 
rates below 10% by the end of the stage. 
The launch phase (7 years): 
In this phase more emphasis should be given to advanced goods and 
services with higher value-added, benefiting from the opportunities that will 
be available after the successful implementation of the first phase. 
Mechanical, electrical and chemical industries should become the core of 
Syrian industry in addition to improving services, such as insurance, 
finance, design, television programs, artistic performances and many other 
activities where the Syrians may excel. Traditional industrial sectors will 
maintain their importance in terms of absolute quality of production, export 
and added values. The development of pioneering industries such as 
electronic and communication industries will begin. The goals of this phase 
are to raise savings and investment by another 5%, and growth rates to 7-8% 
while lowering unemployment to around 7-8%. 
Sustainable growth phase (7 years) 
The main aim of this phase is to focus on knowledge-based, capital-
intensive commodity and service industries that produce higher added value, 
such as electronic and communication industries, advanced financial, 
banking and insurance services, scientific researches and designs etc. 
Mechanical and electrical industries will keep the most important role in 
terms of size and value. Export industries services will receive greater care. 
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The main goals of this phase include raising investment to 35% of GDP, 
growth to 8-10% and lowering unemployment to 5%. 
 
The principle of fair and productive wage and labor market policies  
These policies are a main factor in realizing a fair income distribution. In 
Syria, wageworkers constitute 55.4% of Syrian employees (2,688,171 out of 
4,859,949).3 Therefore, nothing affects as many people as policies on wages 
and salaries, particularly when a worker’s average monthly income is as 
little as SYP 8,693 (ca. $ 185).4 The Statistical Abstract of 2007 shows in 
Table 3/8 that 16% of the employed get salaries of less than SYP 5,000 a 
month, and 61% get less than SYP 9,000. Those who do get more than SYP 
9,000 a month mostly earn it in the public sector (around 52%), whereas 
their rate in the private sector is no more than 23%. And 9,000 SYP is 
hardly enough for a decent life. 
The Syrian state has expanded employment within the so-called "social 
employment policy". It set up rigid legislation in favor of workers, which 
was reflected mainly in tough procedures to dismiss workers. It established 
labor courts and set minimum level of wages. The legislation required that 
employers register their employees with the Social Security system, but the 
application of this legislation is very weak in reality. The Syrian 
government, however, is moving now towards the liberalization of the labor 
market and has prepared a new labor draft law that allows for more 
flexibility in dismissals; this is strongly opposed by the Federation of Trade 
Unions, but it will ultimately find a way to be enacted. 
Objective economic necessities require that the level of wages and 
salaries is equal to the level that ensures the worker the minimum level of 
standard of living enabling him to renew his working energy and to support 
his family in order to produce a new generation of labor force to replace the 
old one. Nevertheless, this level is neither defined nor fixed; it varies 
according to time and place and depends on several factors. One is the 
balance of power between the employers and that of the workers since, if we 
suppose that total income is fixed, raising th share of profits would be at the 
expense of wages and vice versa. The elements in this balance include:  
1. the workers’ level of awareness and organization in syndicates 
capable of negotiating with employers organizations; it is noticeable that 
syndicates in Syria are virtually non-existent in the private sector.  
2. High rates of unemployment put workers in a weak negotiating 
position; in Syria today, as a result, some salaries and wages are no more 
than SYP 3,000 for some private sector workers.  
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3. Also a factor is state legislation regulating the labor market by setting 
a minimum level of wages and salaries, and the capability of state 
institutions to enforce these regulations; it is noticeable that the government 
in Syria has not effectively forced the private sector to abide by labor 
legislation, such as minimum wage levels and joining the social security 
scheme. Only 18.9% of private sector workers are registered in the Social 
Security program, but mostly not based on their full salaries; since all public 
sector workers are registered according to the law, i.e. based on their full 
basic salaries, this gives the private sector an unfair advantage (see table 
2.1).  
4. The workers' capability to express their demands through strikes is 
still restricted in Syria. The state still keeps the old restrictions used when it 
was the major employer; but now that the private sector is the major 
employer workers should be granted the rights of collective bargaining 
appropriate to the move toward a market economy. 
 Besides the balance of power between capital and labour, the 
second important condition in determining salary and wage levels is the 
level of development of the national economy. When the added 
value/income increases, the absolute value of wages will increase even 
though its proportion compared to profits may not increase. That is to say, 
when primary economic sectors, such as agriculture and light manufacturing 
industries that have limited value added, dominate production and when 
productivity is low whether due to the low level of the technology or 
because of weak organization, which is the case of Syria today, it will not be 
possible to substantially raise wages without setting off inflation. However, 
higher productivity does not mean higher wages unless it is associated with 
a balanced negotiation capability by labor, otherwise the increase would be 
transferred to the share of capital i.e. the profits. Therefore, a successful 
policy to develop the levels of wages and salaries requires the development 
of economic sectors with higher added values, which require a highly 
qualified and trained labor force. However, government plans are geared 
towards increasing the total investment without discriminating in favor of 
value added industries.5 
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Table 2.1: Number of people insured with the  
Social Security Establishment6 
Sector Number of 
paid 
workers  
(end 2006) 
Number of 
insured 
workers  
(August 
2007) 
Insured 
people 
(%) 
Public 1,355,763 1,167,963 86.1 
Private 1,325,557 251,101 18.9 
Total 2,681,320 1,419,064 52.9 
 
Since more than one quarter of the Syrian labor force have government 
jobs, state policy also plays a major role in formulating the structure and 
defining the levels of wages and salaries. In general, the average salaries of 
government officials and employees in government institutions are still 
higher than those of the private sector, not at the top income levels but 
because of very low bottom range of wages in the latter. Government policy 
has also aimed at reducing wage differentials in public employment which 
has fallen from that of a top level being nine times as much as that of the 
lowest level at the end of the 1960s to around four times currently. This 
system pushes highly qualified and competent people to leave public service 
for the private sector where top positions are much  better paid, thus leaving 
the less competent in the public sector at the expense of government 
institutions’ capacity. How can we understand, for example, that the salary 
of the general director of the Syrian Petroleum Co., which generates around 
45% of the local budgetary resources and around 70% of the foreign 
exchange budget revenues, does not exceed SYP 18,000; in the same sector 
Syrian petroleum engineers work for years to gain experience, then the best 
of them go abroad which involves a big loss to the state.  
A big obstacle to addressing low government salaries is the high level 
of tax evasion in the private sector. The government has periodically 
increased public sector wages, but this tends to lead to inflation and the 
decline of purchasing power, a problem which it has not yet solved. It is 
necessary to reform radically the government salaries and compensation 
system to increase the maximum levels at the top ranks (to ten times that of 
the lowest level) in order to retain quality manpower.  
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Some in the government sector and many in the private one think that 
raising wages would increase the cost of Syrian products and diminish their 
competitiveness in foreign markets. They claim controlling wage increases 
is a way to create job opportunities, and that low wage jobs are better than 
unemployment. That might be so in some sectors, in the short run, and 
within a development vision that combines traditional sectors of low wages 
and while promoting sectors with higher added value as a long run policy. 
Workers should get fair wages, linked both to the increasing costs of living, 
but also according to the levels of productivity, since high wages cannot be 
sustained without high productivity. In order to prevent a conflict between 
wages and competitiveness, employers should develop applied technology, 
improve the work organization and/or train the workers. They should link 
the wage raise to productivity while the worker, on the other side, should 
show commitment to his duties. This strategy requires investment in 
research and development, which even at low levels could lead to the 
production of Syrian products at European specifications and at Chinese 
prices.  
Another factor affecting wages is monetary policy. Policy makers seek 
to make exports more competitive by reducing the exchange rate of national 
currency, but because this raises the cost of imports and reduces the 
purchasing power of wages and salaries, syndicates are usually against this 
policy or demand wages and salaries increases in exchange. It does not help 
that Syria imports products at internationally rising prices while its exports 
earn low prices on international markets, which again can only be addressed 
by developing higher value-added exports. For many years, Syria had 
multiple centrally fixed exchange rates; in this way it set a low exchange 
rate for basic commodities in order to keep their prices low so as to prevent 
the deterioration of living standards of low-income people, with the 
government providing the hard currency required for private sector imports. 
This multiple exchange rate policy is coming to an end, although the 
government has applied it to defend the Syrian pound exchange rate vs. the 
USD when it declined to around SYP 52/1 USD in 2003 due largely to 
international price increases, pushing it up to 48/1 in 2008, which partially 
helped control the price increases of the last years.  
Based on the above analysis, and in order to make wage levels play 
their positive role in development, growth and equity we recommend the 
following:  
First, the government should enhance the capacity of its institutions to 
organize the labor market and enforce labor and social security legislation in 
the private sector including minimum levels of wages and salaries; 
government intervention is needed to organize the employer/worker relation 
since workers are the weak party, ensure protection from arbitrary dismissal 
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without giving an absolute guarantee against it and ensure fair 
compensation, as well as organizing working hours, vacations and annual 
leaves. At the same time, it is necessary to develop more flexible labor 
legislation since overly rigid ones encourage slackness in implementation. 
Second, there should be a link between levels of wages and prices in 
order to force the business community to raise productivity by developing 
technology, improving the management and upgrading research and 
development. Government planning should prioritize investment in higher 
value-added industries; it also should continue to defend the Syrian pound 
exchange rate in order to stabilize consumer prices.  
Third, the government should secure pre-vocational and vocational 
training programs and follow-up qualification programs to change the career 
or the workplace and career guidance. All that should be done without 
creating any interference that paralyzes the labor market and deters 
investors.  
The trade unions should develop a program to enhance their presence 
and role in the private sector in order to defend workers rights; workers 
should enjoy the right to strike since the private sector is becoming the 
major employer; the government should oversee collective labor contracts 
between a company's workers and its management. The government should 
encouraging the idea of having an elected workers’ representative on the 
boards of big companies to both represent the workers and to help the 
employer increase productivity and reduce costs through involvement of 
workers' leagues in discussing the general policy of private companies, and 
move towards applying the distribution of part of the companies’ profits to 
the workers. 
The principle of expanding and diversifying ownership of property 
The second main instrument of equity in a social market economy is the 
diversification of property ownership. The essential issue is that the 
expansion of production is accompanied by increasing the number of 
owners, with most Syrians becoming owners of small properties, or 
shareholders or participants in cooperatives, resulting in a more equitable 
income distribution. "Property is a Social Responsibility" is a suitable motto 
in this context because individual interests are viewed within the context of 
the wider public interest, but not on the liberal assumption that the pursuit of 
individual interest automatically realizes the public interest. Indeed avoiding 
monopolies of the means of production requires formulating an overall 
government policy aiming to encourage a mixed economy having different 
types of property--big and small private property, co-operative property and 
state property--with none discriminated against and each allowed to 
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compete with the other. This will make obsolete both policies of 
expropriation of private property and of privatization of state-owned 
enterprises, with both extreme positions equally harmful. The concept of 
business enterprise should not be restricted to the private individual 
capitalist one, but should include any economic activity regardless of 
ownership, including the state sector, which should be subject to the same 
regulations, laws and rules. Additionally, private property should not mean 
individual property only; it should include private corporate property such 
as stock property and cooperative property.  
The important issue here is not to sacrifice the expansion of the 
property basis and the realization of social equity to market freedom which 
creates social polarization. Thus, the state needs to develop a set of 
programs to protect cooperative forms of private property as discussed 
below.  
Development of cooperative stock companies 
We need to encourage "cooperative stock companies" in which no 
shareholder will have the right to hold more than a certain percentage of the 
shares because holding a high ratio of shares would enable the holder to 
control the company and its management. All people working for such 
companies will be shareholders and will get part of their rewards as shares 
in the company. The current legislation should be developed to include this 
kind of company and to give them preferential treatment. An example of a 
non-monopolistic cooperative stock company that might be encouraged 
would be a third mobile telephone company. The Ministry of 
Telecommunications and Technology should take the initiative in 
establishing a stock company in which the Telecommunications 
Establishment holds 30% of the shares and tens of thousands of citizens 
hold the remaining 70%. The number of shares held by each shareholder 
should be limited to avoid monopoly; also, it is possible to develop a system 
to allocate some shares to the subscribers, or include the value of some 
shares in the subscription. Some will resist this idea under different pretexts, 
such as that the company's management will fail and it may be corrupted. 
Such a company may face serious challenges, but the idea is sound. It would 
be a publically-owed stock company and not a state-owned one; it elects its 
management according to the rules practiced in stock companies and they 
are subject to monitoring and evaluation. This form is widely spread 
throughout the world and works efficiently and successfully in the free 
market economies. As is the case in big private sector companies, the 
company may be managed by experts, or may make a contract with an 
international company specialized in the management of phone companies. 
All these choices and others are available and can be a success and generate 
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profits, which would be distributed to tens of thousands of shareholders. 
Moreover, Syrians are quite capable of operating such companies. MTN, for 
example, which is the second largest mobile phone operator after Syriatel, 
(owned by the Trade Unions of South Africa) has 1,500 employees and only 
seven of them are non-Syrians. Experience proves that the Syrian labor 
force is able to quickly gain expertise when it works within a suitable 
environment. If some call for privatization, this is privatization. It breaks the 
state monopoly and opens the door for the private sector, but it is not the 
type of privatization desired and sought by some people, where one or a 
handful of businesspersons monopolize a company generating billion of 
Syrian pounds annually; rather we seek a company owned by tens of 
thousands of people. Indeed, this proposal is not to the Minister of 
Telecommunications and Technology, or to the government, rather it is to 
the citizens who have a real interest in such projects and should take the 
initiative and not watch indifferently while others determine their future. 
The software industry is another field that has a big potential for a 
cooperative stock company to operate and find markets in the Gulf and 
Europe. Many examples can be given of companies which, due to many 
members having a stake in them, enlarge the basis of income distribution 
and create new job opportunities.  
Cooperative property development 
The cooperative sector grew up the 19th and 20th centuries, with thinkers 
such as Robert Owen preaching cooperative socialism. Cooperation played 
a prominent role in many countries, especially in agriculture, but in the 
socialist movement, especially the Soviet one, it adopted the "state 
property" approach. However, after the failure and collapse of the Soviet 
experience, cooperative property is being reconsidered in modern societies.  
Cooperation has not played a significant role in Syria, except in the 
housing and agricultural sectors. The state fostered state owned property 
and people did not take initiatives to establish their own cooperative sector. 
Even the parties that adopted socialism and social justice have not paid real 
attention to the importance of developing this sector. However, the under-
utilized potential of cooperation nominates it to play a significant 
socioeconomic role in the future. Indeed, there are many forms of 
establishing cooperative activities, but popular activism is the major source 
of cooperation.  
Many circumstances have hindered this sector and that is why it has 
such a limited role in Syria. The unsuccessful experiences of cooperation in 
Syria will make it difficult convincing people of its potential. Thus, the first 
condition of success is to assess the previous experience. The major lesson 
learnt is that cooperatives have not been voluntary ones, rather they have 
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been imposed by the government through a kind of bureaucratic control so 
the farmers rejected them, and they remained empty forms. The second 
condition is to develop a new law of cooperatives benefiting from similar 
laws in Western countries instead of the current one that is taken from the 
former socialist countries. Such a new law should include some incentives 
to encourage establishing cooperatives. It should also establish a new 
institution to foster cooperation, based on the principles of the private sector 
and subject to the law, i.e. cooperatives should work according to the 
principles of market economy, supply/demand, quality and price 
competition, etc. The government could support such an institution 
financially without intervening in its management. Also important would be 
the training of a group of competent people who believe in cooperation to 
run this sector in Syria, provided that they receive wages similar to their 
equivalents in the private sector. A support program funded by donors and 
by the government would finance the establishment of the cooperative 
sector, train its staff and carry out a media promotional campaign. The role 
of an impartial judiciary would be to guard it against the misuse of the trust 
granted to cooperative staff. The most important condition is to foster some 
models that set an example and develop experience. The following are fields 
in which cooperatives would be particularly beneficial.  
Consumer cooperatives could be an effective response to the wave of 
price increases throughout the world, including Syria, and the high rates of 
profit achieved by intermediate activities. The people of a town, or of a 
quarter in a city, could establish a consumer cooperative. Such cooperatives 
can connect producers directly to consumers who will get the goods at lower 
prices provided they are sold at reasonable margins of profit. Such 
cooperatives could rent from the Ministry of Economy the retail halls of the 
General Establishment for Consumption instead of renting them to big 
businesspersons, who are actively trying to appropriate them.  
The housing cooperative sector in Syria has accumulated some very 
good experience. It has provided houses to hundreds of thousands of 
families. Notable is the experience of the Dummar Housing Cooperative 
Project, where several housing cooperatives gathered in the mid 1970s and 
developed a housing project of 5000 apartments, which became one of the 
main housing areas in Damascus. It was a success in spite of the difficulties 
it encountered, especially as the initial idea was that the project itself 
undertakes the building works. The experience of this project is worthy of 
study and replication but, unfortunately, it has been repeated neither in 
Damascus nor in other cities.  
The state has supported the housing cooperative sector through 
allocating residential lands to the cooperatives at low prices and through 
establishing a specialized bank for real estate lending at easy conditions for 
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cooperatives, whose activity, along with individual building of houses, 
dominated most of the housing industry. The role of housing cooperation in 
Syria is threatened by the rise of private real estate companies, Arab and 
Syrian. These companies will use their influence to compete for the best 
lands for building. Therefore, it is important for people to maintain this 
important sector to provide them with housing. 
Syria also has experience with agricultural cooperatives. Although this 
has not gone beyond carrying out some administrative procedures jointly, 
such as getting loans in kind and cash loans, receiving seeds, and the like, it 
has great potentials to address many current and future problems. The first 
problem has been the fragmentation of land to small and very smallholdings 
that are not efficiently exploitable by individuals working alone. Second, 
there is the need to expand the use of agricultural mechanization and to 
change to capital-intensive farming in order to increase land productivity. 
This can happen only through the expansion of capacity through pooling 
resources in cooperatives. These cooperatives could promote the 
introduction of new crops and make contracts with consumer cooperatives 
or with food industry firms to market their products under good conditions. 
They also could establish workshops to sort, wrap and package the products, 
which increases the added value and profitability. Additionally, they could 
establish small food industries like the associations of grape farmers in 
Cyprus, who have a plant for manufacturing wine from their grapes.  
Developing properties of municipalities and local community organizations  
Municipalities can extend their property alone or in cooperation with local 
partners. They can encourage the establishment of cooperative companies of 
the residents by commissioning them to deliver services such as cleaning, 
maintenance, and the like. They may form partnerships with the local 
people to establish a company to exploit tourist attractions in a town and its 
surroundings. Additionally, they may form partnerships with trade unions to 
establish a cooperative company to implement any kind of business or 
industries. Coalitions between a municipality and civil society associations 
have great potential to establish service companies and businesses that 
expand the base of property and income distribution. The first requirement 
for the success of such a sector is that the municipal council represents and 
is accountable to the local citizens and that the people elect the mayor who 
should be a local citizen. 
Developing trade unions' property 
Among the so far wasted potentials is the lost opportunity to establish 
companies owned by syndicates, either by trade unions or by professional 
association. In Syria, there are a relatively large number of syndicates, 
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whose members constitute a large proportion of the population (see table 
2.2). 
 
Table 2.2: Syndicate membership 
Syndicate Members 
204 trade unions with 188 social aid funds 808,419 
Bar Association  19,346 
Association of Engineers 94,606 
Association of Agronomists  24,220 
Association of Teachers 294,831 
Association of Physicians  27,636 
Association of Dentists  13,766 
Association of Pharmacists  12,192 
Association of Artists  n.a. 
Association of Journalists  n.a. 
Authors Union n.a. 
Total = 808,419 (trade unions) and 486,597 
(other associations) 
1,295,019 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, The Syrian Statistical Abstract, 
2007. 
These unions could establish specialized companies related to their field of 
activity. The trade unions have made several investments, but their returns 
were negligible because their management suffered from the same 
bureaucratic nature as the government administration. Investments of the 
Association of Engineers have been better in comparison, but remained 
limited. Professional associations, especially the Association of Engineers, 
but also those of physicians, pharmacists, lawyers and teachers have 
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accumulated large unutilized funds which they deposit at banks where they 
get limited returnsl these could be used to start companies.  
Cooperative stock companies for distribution set up by trade unions 
Trade unions in partnership with professional associations could also 
establish a cooperative non-monopolistic stock company to distribute 
consumer goods, e.g. by establishing chains of retail stores throughout 
Syria. They could contribute to a part of the capital and allow the other part 
to be subscribed by the members and even by the public. Such a company 
would have the elements of potential success, basically, the number of 
members and around 1.5 million potential customers, which is an important 
market that no private company has. Such a company may, and perhaps 
must, make a contract with a specialized management company or with a 
series of warehouses worldwide to develop a complete operation and 
management system to ensure efficient performance, which attracts 
members and non-members as customers. A cooperative stock company 
could also be formed to establish hospitals, in which the Associations of 
Physicians and Pharmacists, and perhaps others participate. They could also 
establish a cooperative stock company for medicine manufacturing, drug 
distribution warehouses and pharmacies. This industry is flourishing in 
Syria; now, it covers about 90% of Syria's need for medicines and also 
exports to dozens of countries. A cooperative stock company for 
engineering studies could be initiated by the Association of Engineers, or 
jointly with other associations. Syria lacks such a company, while a large 
number of small offices with limited capabilities practice this profession. 
Syrians are masters in this kind of services, and the World Wide Web 
provides an important opportunity to provide these services from Syria 
directly to the world, notably to markets in the Gulf States and Europe, 
where labor costs are high.  
Developing state property  
Despite the attack waged by liberalism on state property and the efforts 
made to attribute all evils to it, the argument that the state should not own at 
all is a typical ideological one refuted by reality. On the other hand, we do 
not consider state property a social one owned by people collectively since 
it is the government, and perhaps only the minister and some ministerial 
staff, that takes decisions about state property.  
This leads us to the issue of the state's investment policy. The 
government's allocations for investment in the state sector are declining 
with negative effects on the development process and the government's 
capability to carry out its duties, especially since the major part of public 
investment expenditure is on government buildings, hospitals, schools, 
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universities and their equipment, not on factories and companies. The 
treasury faces a clear problem that needs to be addressed urgently. It owns 
about 250 companies and economic establishments, whose contribution to 
the treasury falls yearly. Eight companies, mostly oil firms, provide around 
100 billion SYP/year, while 242 companies and government establishment 
provide only 38 billion SYP/year because most of them are loss-making and 
a large part of the surplus of profit making companies is taken to cover the 
deficits of other companies. Additionally, in 2008, the state budget revenues 
were estimated to amount to about SYP 400 billion in 2008 and the 
expenditures SYP 600 billion. This is in spite of reducing investment 
expenditure, which traditionally was half the budget, to 38% of the total 
expenditure.7  
The second issue is the government's inability to reform the public 
sector, which is being left to deteriorate further. It is not a matter of lacking 
solutions, as there are many and the matter has been discussed repeatedly in 
detail but a government decision is needed. The author has participated in 
more than one government committee to reform the public sector and 
developed more than one detailed diagnosis and prescription for designing a 
new management for it that guarantees its financial and administrative 
independence and to raise its competitiveness in an open market. Among the 
main recommendations are: to conduct a comprehensive diagnosis of each 
public sector company's financial and asset status; to distinguish on this 
basis companies that the state wants to keep for strategic reasons, such as 
cereals, fuel, water and electricity and to reform these and to dissolve 
companies that are non-viable and unable to compete in the market. 
Reforming public companies involves restructuring them through mergers 
and giving them management independence to allow them flexibility similar 
to private firms. Furthermore, they should be exempted from the laws and 
legislation of the administrative sector, including the system of contracts, 
salaries, compensation and others. For one time only, the treasury should 
cancel their debts and provide start up capital. An agency to manage the 
government's investments in the public sector companies should be created 
to work according to the standards of holding companies in the private 
sector. The capital accounts of public companies should be opened for 
investment by other public companies, private sector partners and citizens, 
with the situation of each company considered separately. The companies' 
subordination to the Central Authority for Control and Inspection should be 
ended, keep them under the supervision of the Financial Control Body only. 
The companies should develop their internal systems to operate according to 
market rules. A program should be set up to address the problem of surplus 
staff in the governmental economic sector; this could be dealt with by 
employing part of them in other reformed companies or through paying 
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compensation to those wishing to leave work or take early retirement. In all 
cases, costs would be much less than in the current system. Reforming the 
public sector will save huge amounts of money for the state and change the 
public sector from an institution that wastes public money to one that 
supports production, feeds the treasury and creates jobs.  
Developing small and medium properties  
This sector plays today a big role in the economies of developed countries. 
It is, also, anticipated to play such a role in Syria, where for many years it 
was the dominant sector since the policy of nationalizing large companies 
discouraged their growth. All agricultural properties became small and 
medium ones after the land reform. The state also fostered the small sector 
through state banks: thus, the Popular Credit Bank was created in 1966 to 
grant easy loans to small traders, artisans, professionals and low-income 
people at an interest rate ranging between 7% and 9%; likewise, the 
Agricultural Bank makes loans to farmers at low interest rates ranging 
between 4.5% and 6%. In the transport sector most passenger and cargo 
vehicles are individually owned; transport companies appeared only after 
enacting Law 10 of 1991. Private construction contracting companies did 
business mostly with the state and, at the same time, were at a disadvantage 
in competing with the state construction sector. Also, the small sector 
controlled real estate activity entirely, while large real estate companies 
appeared in Syria only as late as 2006. The absence of big chain companies 
meant that the small and micro sector controlled the retail trade and only in 
the last two years big malls started to appear, and their market share is still 
small though anticipated to grow.  
According to the "General Census of Population and Housing, 
Enterprise Stocktaking and Agricultural Census", carried out by the Central 
Bureau of Statistics in 2004, the number of enterprises operating in Syria 
was estimated to be around 600,000, with micro enterprises of less than five 
workers constituting around 500,000 of these. The private sector owns 92% 
of the economic enterprises operating in Syria. 95.5% of private properties 
are individual ones, while only 4.5% are corporate properties. Thus, family, 
micro and small enterprises form 99.5% of total private enterprises, with 
96% for micro enterprises and 3.5% for small enterprises (see table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3: Distribution of micro and small enterprises  
by economic activity 
Economic 
Activity  
Less than 5 workers 5-14 workers 
Number % Number % 
Agriculture & 
Fishing 9,089 1.80 434 2.34 
Manufacturing 81,475 16.13 10,309 55.47 
Trade 316,521 62.68 4,491 24.16 
Restaurants 12,855 2.55 1,038 5.58 
Transport and 
storing 7,338 1.45 540 2.91 
Real estates 20,531 4.07 300 1.61 
Education 1,052 0.21 504 2.71 
Health 19,691 3.90 220 1.18 
Social 
services 31,283 6.19 403 2.17 
Other sectors 5,179 1.03 347 1.87 
Total 505,014 100 18,586 100 
 
     Current reform policies threaten the role of small enterprises as 
establishing large companies would drive small businesspeople from the 
market. The solution is not to return to the policy of discouraging big 
investments, but to encourage small investors to merge into cooperatives or 
cooperative companies, which combines economies of scale with broad-
based ownership. The other side is the development of a package of policies 
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to support small and medium enterprises, which Syria began several years 
ago. Accordingly, we think that the state must conduct a comprehensive 
study on small and micro enterprises and develop a clear strategy for the 
specific roles that these enterprises can play within specific areas, identify 
clearly the promising sectors for investment, and develop a package of 
commercial and tax policies that encourage small enterprises' investment. 
Another issue that needs addressing is the extreme geographical 
concentration of businesses, with about half of them (49%) located in the 
three big governorates: Damascus, Rural Damascus and Aleppo, reflecting, 
to some extent, the geographical distribution of income. Therefore, it is very 
important that the government launches an effective program to develop the 
other regions, especially the Eastern Region (see table 2.4). 
Table 2.4: Geographical distribution of micro and small enterprises 
Governorate 
Less than 5 workers 5-14 workers 
Numb
er % 
Num
ber % 
Damascus & 
Rural 
Damascus 
138,
147 
27.
36 
5,
465 
29.
40 
Aleppo 109,694 
21.
72 
7,
723 
41.
55 
Homs 50,162 
9.9
3 
1,
094 
5.8
9 
Hama 30,596 
6.0
6 873 
4.7
0 
Other 
Governorate
s 
176,
415 
34.
93 
3,
431 
18.
46 
Total 505,014 100 
18,
586 100 
 
Enhancing medium and large private investment  
A Model for a Social Market Economy in Syria   61 
The national private medium and large investment will play an increasing 
role under reform, with the legislative, regulatory and institutional structure, 
including consultation mechanisms with the private sector aimed to tap the 
great potential for such investment. A comprehensive development strategy 
with clear priorities is essential to direct the private sector's investments in a 
way that promotes job creation, develops the structure of the economy, 
raises productivity, introduces industries of higher added value and develops 
exports. This requires that local medium and large private sector enterprises 
restructure and rid themselves of the distortions created in the past in order 
to be competitive at the regional and global levels.  
This sector can take two distinguishable forms. Large individual private 
firms, whether owned by an individual or a family or a stock company 
owned by a small number of shareholders, is the major, if not the dominant, 
form in Syria today. It will continue to exist in all areas of investment open 
for it within the social market economy. The expansion of this form of 
property and its future dominance, particularly through the decline of small 
firms, threatens to lead to a polarization of wealth. Current reforms are 
encouraging this sector, and while this is required, little attention is given to 
other sectors as a result of large companies' strength and ability to influence 
and exploit globalization. Since leaving it to the free market would, no 
doubt, lead to monopoly and polarization, there is a need to strengthen other 
forms to achieve a social balance and higher level of social equity.  
A type of large firm that should be encouraged is the traditional stock 
company which gives small savers the opportunity to invest their saving 
through a stock market. This type of companies started to grow early in 
Syria, beginning with the establishment of Dummar Cement Factory in the 
early 1930s. In the 1950s many such companies were founded. However, 
after the nationalization measures new companies started to take the form of 
family or limited liability companies with a small number of partners. Only 
with the new reforms are stock companies starting to re-emerge offering 
their shares for public underwriting, beginning with the establishment of 
private banks and insurance companies. Law 61 of 2007 was issued to 
facilitate the transformation of family companies into closed stock 
companies which prepared the way for their conversion into stock 
companies offering part of their shares for public underwriting. Income Tax 
Law 24 of 2003, amended by Law 51 of 2006, was issued to reduce 
corporate income taxes to between 14% and 28%, which is low by 
international standards. 14% applies to stock companies, which offer more 
than half of their shares for public underwriting, and 28% to all other types 
of companies. Also, the long-awaited stock exchange will play a role in 
promoting this type of company. The stock market can contribute to 
providing companies with funds, while it also expands the basis of property 
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and increases the number of owners, thereby broadening the basis of income 
distribution.  
However, stock companies which do not set strict ceilings on the shares 
any individual can own will fall under the control of one or a few investors. 
For example, the experiences of stock companies, which have an ownership 
ceiling of 5% of shares per investor, show that an investor may evade the 
rules by buying more than 5% through his children or brothers so that he, 
under a few names, controls the company. In addition to that, he manages 
the shares of other companies and exploits the company for the interests of a 
few. A related problem which allows such practices is the complete absence 
of any supervisory agencies or auditing institutions, or even an effective 
honest judiciary to protect small shareholders. Syrians' refusal to buy the 
shares of some companies, which have announced their conversion into 
stock companies, expressed their lack of confidence in them. By contrast, 
the experience of private banks and insurance companies, which have non-
Syrian strategic partners, apply auditing and transparency standards, and 
care about their reputation, show that the Syrians are keen to buy shares. 
This deficiency requires urgent treatment so small investors will have 
confidence in stock companies. 
The principle of the private sector’s social contribution  
In the modern market economy, companies' social care programs play an 
increasing role in redistributing part of the income. Today companies 
around the world boast about their social programs, such as scholarships to 
excellent students, sponsoring cultural activities, donations to social 
associations of people with special needs, environment protection programs, 
historical sites conservation programs, empowerment of the poor programs 
and so on. This transformation, which is characterized by the declining role 
of the government's social protection, has obvious ideological meanings but 
is nevertheless a positive contribution. But only a few Syrian private 
companies have such programs today and their contributions are often 
restricted to charities that provide food, clothes and medicine to the poor, 
which is a traditional form of charity. 
The predominant contradiction today is between a company, which is 
privately owned and managed, and its character as a social institution in 
whose production hundreds, thousands or even tens of thousands are 
involved, and to whose success and failure many interests are linked, 
including those of its workers, the consumers of its products or services, and 
its suppliers of raw materials and services. They are affected as well by its 
commitment to its duties and financial, productive and social obligations 
and the like. Mitigating this contradiction takes place within a social market 
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economy through wider participation of the workers and stakeholders in the 
company’s decisions, without affecting the property ownership. Thus, 
increasing the social nature of private companies is an issue that is wider 
than mere social care programs despite their importance.  
There are two approaches that can be taken in this regard. Companies 
can be given tax incentives to develop various social programs. Recently, 
the income tax law included giving companies the possibility to make 
donations to public organizations and non-profitable private ones of no 
more than 3% of the company’s profits. Some companies set an example by 
establishing social programs, such as allocating scholarships for students, 
arranging training courses for the unemployed, establishing a clinic in a 
quarter or a district, contributing to cleaning the environment in a certain 
area, or supporting a specific cultural program, etc. These are voluntary 
programs benefiting the company’s reputation. Beyond this, big companies 
can be encouraged to become social institutions in addition to being profit-
making ones for their owners. The workers could be given a stake in the 
company through shares and by representation in the company’s annual 
general assembly. The company should also be subject to a public social 
review in order to assess its not just its annual economic performance but 
also its meeting of its social obligations. This review includes the way it 
deals with its workers, their rights, salaries and incentives and registration in 
the Social Security system, their fulfillment of tax obligations,  as well as 
product quality. This, also, includes transparent disclosure that it has not 
practiced any activities in contradiction with the laws and has neither 
evaded any taxes or fees, nor smuggled goods or paid bribes. This would be 
a community review rather than a governmental one and it should be for the 
good of the company as it provides the company with an ethically valuable 
testimony. This should be a factor when the company bids for government 
contracts and in its dealings with banks, as it is a “clean company”. The 
private sector's initiative to launch such programs would be an indicator of 
its ability to be up to national needs. 
The principal of an active society  
A social market economy cannot succeed without an active civil society. 
The economy is an arena for both the conflict and cooperation of interests; 
the parties in market relations can be clustered in the following major 
actors: Employers are represented by organizations, such as chambers of 
commerce, industry and tourism. They are a minority in terms of numbers, 
but have the greater power due to their financial strengths and great effect 
on the market; the workers, of both the state and private sectors, constitute 
the biggest mass in terms of number, which gives them the potential to have 
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influence which, to be realized requires they organize themselves in parties, 
syndicates, and community organizations for farmers, students, women, etc. 
A big critical mass in between consists of small property holders. The state 
is an arbiter and organizer of the society and is subject to pressures from the 
actors.  
The success of social market economy requires an active community 
that makes the workers and small property holders able to express their 
interests. It also requires a clear governmental vision and ability to manage 
negotiations among the actors so as to maintain balance with a view to 
realize its socioeconomic goals. To organize a dialogue between the parties 
a socioeconomic council should be formed containing the representatives of 
the three main parties. This council should be a platform to discuss and 
agree on the rules that maintain balance and stimulate holistic 
socioeconomic development. 
We need an active society to overcome the barriers that would obstruct 
the social market model, particularly that of corruption and misuse of 
power. The main reason that prevents people from participation in 
cooperatives, private collective properties and properties of municipalities, 
trades unions and the state is their fear that corruption and misuse of power 
by those who assume the management of these organizations may eat up the 
participants’ money and efforts. The government's agencies and the 
judiciary, in their current status, are unable to protect the rights of 
stakeholders because corruption can easily achieve its purposes. Therefore, 
people believe that those who misuse the powers delegated to them by 
members of companies and associations, shareholders, etc. are 
unaccountable, which will block people from joining cooperatives or 
investing in private collective property. This diminishes the emergence of 
these types of property and weakens the cornerstone of property expansion. 
Moreover, there is the Syrian citizens' individualism and reluctance to 
participate, which is the result of culture, on one hand, and of lack of trust 
from the damaging practices they suffered for decades.  
The establishing of a social market economy and the realization of 
development requires an active anti-corruption program led by an anti-
corruption agency; a reform of the judiciary to combat internal corruption 
and enhance its efficiency; the separation of the legislative, executive and 
judicial powers -especially removing the executive power’s control over the 
other two powers-, and a wide participation by the people, particularly with 
regard to the establishment of cooperatives and cooperative companies. 
Here the role of trade unions, professional associations, civil organizations 
and political parties, which were and still are inactive in this regard, is 
crucial. The media also plays a crucial role in promotion and mobilization. 
Society should have a proactive role rather than being satisfied with letting 
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government take the initiatives: a social market economy should have 
initiatives from the three parties: government, business community and civil 
society. 
Conclusion:  
History is proof that neither a monopolizing state and weak society, nor an 
economy monopolied by giant corporations and a weak state are the answer 
to development. Humanity is asking how to couple economic growth and 
social justice.  
If Syria is not to make the transition to a neo-liberal version of a market 
economy by default and hence to suffer growing social inequality, a “smart” 
state must take an active role. It must deploy its macro-economic policies in 
a way that is sensitive to the social distributional consequences, must 
organize and regulate the labour market and must promote a wide 
distribution of property ownership.  So far, its reforms have largely 
neglected this social side. If a social market economy is to emerge a 
corrective in this policy tangent is in order. 
But how could the ideas in this proposal be realized in practice? It 
needs a suitable legal framework, an efficient and uncorrupted judiciary and 
bureaucracy and a change in conservative mentalities. But this, too, is a 
matter of a struggle of classes and interests. As such, a suitable outcome is 
only possible with an active civil society including freedom of expression, 
the right to organize and to strike and a party law. President Asad promised 
the issuance of a party law and the Syrians are waiting for that.   
 
                                                
1 Dr. Issam Azzaem, interviewed by Castro Nassi, Qassyoun, 21/07/2005, 
retrieved from All-4-Syria. 
2 Although the government speaks a lot about participation and the social 
aspects of reform in order to deflect accusations that it prioritizes the business 
community and profit, analyzing the policies applied and the results achieved 
give clear evidence that the social side is ignored; moreover, this is not a 
coincidence but a deliberate policy that is not likely to change. 
3 Refer to the Statistical Abstract of 2007, table 3/5. 
4 Refer to the Syrian Economic Trends Bulletin, Volume 1, Issue1, Oct. 
2007 (ISMF- SPC). 
5 For more useful details refer to UNDP (2004), “Report on Education and 
Human Development in Syria”, particularly pages 136-143. 
6 The Social Security Establishment Report of 2006, and Economy and 
Transport Magazine, February, 2008. 
7 The actual investment expenditure has not exceeded 60% of the 
allocations. 
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Appendix: Debates on the Political 
Economy of Reform 
Proceedings of the Conference, “Syria in a Changing World” 
Damascus 7-9 November 2008 
Sponsored jointly by the Centre for Syrian Studies University (CSS), St. 
Andrews, and the Orient Centre for International Studies (OCIS), Damascus 
 
The following reports on the papers given at the 2008 conference in 
Damascus and the discussion that accompanied them. The papers fall into 
four categories:  
1) The historical context which provides some insights into the background 
to the current situation in Syria, including the on-going negative role of the 
US and the heritage of Hafiz al-Asad.  
2) Debates over the role of the state in reform, the politics of reform, the 
nature of the social market economy which is the official goal of transition, 
the obstacles to its achievement and its social consequences.  
3) Reform developments in two key sectors of the economy, agriculture and 
industry.  
4) The external context of reform, including relations with Lebanon, Turkey 
and Europe and the development of the peace process. 
1) The historical context 
Syria under the Liberal Regime and the impact of US policy  
(Sami Moubayed, Kalamoun University) 
The first problem of independent Syria was to assert government control 
over its territory and ward off subversion from neighbours. But the first elite 
was urban centred and feared strengthening the army to accomplish this 
would threaten the regime, especially as there was plotting in the army by 
Jordan and Iraq. There was a proposal to dissolve and reconstruct the army 
by recruitment from Damascene elite families and the Minister of Defence 
was told to weaken the army. As a result of this and corruption in army 
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supplying, Syria was unprepared for the war of 1948. The defeat cost the 
elite its legitimacy.  
Then the regime faced pressures from the US and Israel. There were 
disputes with the US over Syria’s closing of the Tapline oil pipe from Saudi 
Arabia over the Palestine issue, over the role of the communists in Syria and 
over the conditions of truce with Israel. One of the first CIA operations led 
to the coup by Husni al-Zaim against Quwatli after which a truce was 
signed, Tapline reopened and the communists repressed. 
In the 1954-58 period, a golden age of pluralism, the US again 
attempted regime change through coups. When the Ba’th and communists 
won seats in the elections Washington was alarmed; Syria was also accused 
of meddling in Lebanon. US interference strengthened the nationalist-leftist 
forces and pushed Syria toward the USSR.  The parallels between this and 
contemporary US-Syria relations are striking. 
Comment of Ibrahim Yakhour: Quwatli assumed the role of za’im, 
more than just the presidency and hence the opportunity to have a modern 
constitutional state was lost. He wanted to be the leader of the Damascene 
bourgeoisie that looked down on those from outside Damascus, especially 
the peasants. 
Syria under Hafiz al-Asad  
(George Jabbur, former advisor of the late president) 
Hafiz was the most important figure in modern Syria. His personal attributes 
were important to his leadership.  He was upright and modest in his personal 
behaviour, a hard worker who worked very long hours, and a good listener 
who did not interrupt others. He talked to subordinates individually over the 
telephone rather than face-to-face together. In domestic politics his ideal 
was to forge a consensus, co-opting non-Ba’this into his government.  
Comment of Nizar Mayhoob: Hafiz established Syria’s regional and 
international stature. The legacy of Hafiz has been used under Bashar to 
survive the external turbulence and pressures. Such pressures exerted on 
another regime would have led to capitulation. 
2) State and Reform 
Syria, Post-populist State (Samir al-Taqi, Director of OCIS) 
In the populist era there was an alliance of social forces with the state, 
initially the peasants, but later the private sector was included in a regulated 
way. The state was over-powerful and too autonomous of the alliance of 
social forces in its coalition. Now, under pressure of economic problems 
and globalization, the social contract is being changed to facilitate economic 
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growth. The neo-liberal shock therapy model has elsewhere had high costs 
or has ended in disaster and Syria’s production relations and forces are not 
yet able to be competitive on the global market. So Syria is pursuing a 
gradual transition, being selective in adopting from other experiences, in 
order to find its own model. The current situation is that there is some 
separation of the political structure from economic affairs and property is 
more secure. The insurance and banking sectors are developing well and the 
black market declining.  
Comment of Samir Seifan: the hierarchical state both protects and 
burdens the economy, which is a contradiction. What explains Syria’s slow, 
selective reform? The state finds it hard to renege on the social contract and 
to favour the rich. Also the state lacks experience with market regulation. 
External pressures preoccupied the leadership; but with their relaxation, its 
focus is again on domestic affairs. The bureaucracy is unwieldy and opposes 
reform, which threatens its interests. Subsidies and social spending, though 
a burden, cannot be withdrawn without social shocks and has to be 
accompanied by a salaries policy. This is hard to manage with oil revenues 
going down. The crony capitalist private sector also is not very competitive.  
Comment: In the Arab countries the period of revolutionary legitimacy 
went on too long at the expense of developing institutional legitimacy. 
Comment: Should economic or political reform come first? If political 
change goes too fast, you get collapse, as in the Soviet case; if political 
reform lags you get the predatory state, as in Zaire. A middle way would be 
increased rule of law and participation constrained by the needs of stability.  
Comment: we need reform of the judiciary if we are to get investment. 
It now takes 5-10 years to get a judgment. You have to give people security 
of ownership. International arbitration is very costly. We need coherent 
laws, too, and institutions to prepare laws like the Library of Congress in the 
US. We need codification of the laws and less contradiction among them. 
Fewer and better laws is the better approach. We need good media in order 
for the public to be aware of the laws. 
A Syrian Model of a Social Market Economy (Samir Seifan, Director of 
Arab Development Consultants, Damascus) 
Syria’s reform is being implemented without a strategy, facing resistance 
from vested interests and suffering from administrative weaknesses. As a 
result the poor are being victimized. What is needed is a merit bureaucracy 
to drive reform.  
A proper model of a social market economy needs an effective market 
to succeed, with government using fiscal and monetary policy rather than 
direct intervention. Indicative planning should encourage movement from 
low value to more high value production using more technology. There has 
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to be a mixed economy, with a public sector concentrated in fields that don’t 
compete with the private sector and encouragement of a cooperative sector. 
The private sector firms should have to contribute to health and education 
and social insurance for their workers; the trade unions have to be activated 
as stakeholders in firms.  
Comment of Nabil Marzouk: The social market economy in Syria is just 
a slogan and has no practical content. A social market economy has to be 
differentiated from a neo-liberal economy, which is what officials are 
currently pursuing through de-regulation. For a social market economy to 
work there has to be some balance of power but the unions and the state are 
too weak. Cooperatives can’t work in a market economy, which inevitably 
leads to concentration of ownership. Only profit seeking, not social 
responsibility drives firms in a market economy.  
Comment: In Syria we have the worst of socialist and liberal 
economies. What is happening is just the empowerment of capital at the 
expense of labor, but the unions and parties are silent. No official can say no 
to investors was raised as a slogan of the regime. To have a balance we need 
reform of the judiciary and a free press. Also we need competition on the 
market, which is lacking.  The current policy is encouraging industrialists to 
become traders.   
Comment: The government team does not believe in the social part of 
the market economy. The prerequisites of the social market system are 
lacking. What about restoring the law on 25% of profits going to workers? 
Social Consequences of Reform  
(Yasin Haj Salah, al-Hiyat; separately solicited paper) 
A new bourgeoisie, made up of sons of officials, has emerged and under 
Bashar has achieved independence from the state. Despite the official 
slogan of a social market economy, in fact neo-liberalism is being 
promoted. The wealthy get more freedom and the regime slogan was that 
any official that said no to an investor would be dismissed while workers 
and ordinary Syrians face repression. As the social contract is abandoned, 
the impoverishment of people pushes them into reliance on local 
communities--sect and tribe. The extreme poverty of the pre-revolutionary 
period is coming back; one commentator speaks of the “Beirutization” of 
Damascus. The middle class is squeezed since salaries are not enough to 
live on. The unions, the National Progressive Front, and some figures on the 
party Regional Command blame Abdullah Dardari, deputy Prime Minister 
of Economy, the architect of economic liberalization and have called for an 
end to this policy and for preserving the social gains of the revolution.  
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Administrative Reform in Syria (Saam Dalleh) 
The civil administration is under pressure to reform. Bashar’s presidential 
acceptance speech stressed this, as did the resolutions of the Ba’th party 10th 
regional congress and the 10th Five-year plan. We have more demanding 
and aware citizens from whom you cannot hide much. The new economic 
environment requires a suitable modernized administration. The new style is 
that government should only intervene in the economy when necessary to 
correct problems.  
The bureaucracy is oversized and centralized and puts its own needs 
over those of citizens. It lacks skills and experience; strategic objectives are 
lost because bureaucratic feudalism frustrates coordination. Personal loyalty 
is put over merit recruitment; there is a weakness in information and 
statistics due to lack of IT; corruption is a problem. Reform requires 
developing human resources, fighting corruption and bringing in new 
technology such as IT.  
Comment by Talal Abboud: The core problem is the lack of effective 
taxation, hence low salaries that encourages corruption. Big investors are 
evading taxes and few companies have auditing practices. 
Dilemmas of the Politics of Transition (General Discussion) 
How is the transition conceptualized? In the 10th party congress there were 
debates over whether to say the goal was transition to a market economy but 
others insisted on the social side without being clear what it entailed. 
Ideally, the transition to the market economy is to be accompanied by social 
protections. President Bashar al-Asad said that we are free to take what we 
want and reject what we want from outside models. There is a dispute over 
whether the public sector should be maintained but not over the need for 
state regulation. The regime, and especially the security forces, sees the risk 
of deepening liberalization and is aware of the grumbling among the public. 
Why in practice is there neither a real market economy nor social 
protections? One answer is that state capacity building takes time. Another 
is that the distribution of burdens and benefits in the transition will depend 
on the social balance of power and to ensure an equitable transition you 
have to empower people politically. In any liberalizing country crony 
capitalists can hijack the benefits and corruption exaggerates the inequalities 
produced by a market economy. In China, there was also growing 
corruption and inequality but there was enough growth to buffer the cost.  
Populist welfare is being retracted and the government seems unable to 
protect workers and peasants from the pain of transition. There are not funds 
available for social protections because oil revenue has declined while 
taxation of new wealth has lagged. Tax collection is hindered by firms’ lack 
of disclosure of earnings, lack of IT and databases and the corruption of the 
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tax collectors. There has, however, been a real improvement in tax 
collection.  
In the short term, liberalization inflicts pain and until investment 
produces jobs there are no benefits; all the people experience is price rises 
and unemployment. The Minister of Labor says the law provides that the 
private sector should be unionized but only 14% of workers are. There is a 
draft labor law on more flexibility in firing, needed to assure investors; but 
the unions have been stalling it for two years, wanting in exchange social 
safety nets. A few factories provide social services to keep good employees 
but most businessmen that contribute to charity build mosques rather than 
hospitals.  
The world financial crisis may undermine the reformers. Although 
Syria is too un-integrated into the world economy to be immediately 
affected by bank collapses, it will be affected by the consequent deep 
recession. This could lead to a fall in the prices of imports but will also slow 
investment inflows and development aid. Syria should learn the lesson from 
the crisis and regulate bank lending and the inflow and outflow of 
currencies. In fact, Syrian banks may be too prudent in insisting on such 
high security for lending that lending is too low to stimulate investment.  
At this point, there are not many believers in a market economy in 
either the elites, the press or the population. But liberalization cannot be 
reversed because entrenched interests in favour of it are too powerful. The 
current economic team could be made the scapegoat but the course will not 
be reversed although it could be slowed or stalled. 
3) Reform in Key Economic Sectors 
The Agricultural Sector (Atieh al-Hindi, Ministry of Agriculture) 
Syria has moved from being an importing to exporting country in 
agriculture. Cultivated area and food calorie intake have also grown. But 
Syria has suffered from recent drought, with 2008 experiencing only one 
quarter of usual rainfall. There is a water deficit. In regard to Euphrates 
water, Turkey releases an average of 500 million cu/meters/second when we 
want this to be a minimum as sometimes the amount released is insufficient. 
Agriculture was liberalized; now only tobacco, sugar beet and cotton are 
marketed by the state [grains used to be state marketed]; central planning 
has been abandoned for indicative planning.  
Problems not yet addressed include the fragmentation of holdings under 
high population growth, which means investment on holdings is low and 
most agricultural bank loans are short term ones for financing seasonal 
inputs.  
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GAFTA allows imports of agricultural products from other Arab 
countries but Syria has also been able to export and it has benefited more 
than the competition hurt it. Our agricultural trade balance was positive till 
2005 after which drought has hurt production and it has turned negative. 
Comment of Munzar Khaddam: Misuse of water is a chronic problem. 
Compared to Jordan, our modern irrigation methods have lagged. 
Fragmentation of ownership is an obstacle to modern irrigation, but the state 
made it worse by distributing state farms to their employees. Because we 
don’t use all our share of Euphrates water, it is exported to Iraq (Syria takes 
42% and Iraq 58% of water released by Turkey). Only 55% of our fertilizer 
is produced domestically. We have 1000 agricultural extension units but this 
is hidden unemployment as they do little. Loans of the agricultural bank 
have decreased 40%. Bad agricultural marketing practices continue, with 
bad products hidden under good ones. The EU agreement will demand 
harmonization of standards in agriculture that no Syrian peasant can comply 
with.  
Comment: There needs to be laws to stop urban encroachment on 
agricultural land. 
Syrian Industry (Fuad Lahham, formerly of Ministry of Industry) 
Syrian industry is in big trouble and we need it more than ever in a post-oil 
era. The contribution of industry to GNP has fallen as low as 7% (compared 
to 20% in Egypt) and is mostly light or semi-manufactured goods with 
limited value added and technology used.  
Syria had a good start in industrialization in the fifties, with 150 share-
holding companies and a good location. After nationalization, the private 
sector exited or downsized. The public sector failed because the priority was 
social (e.g. employment), while external rent buffered it from the need to be 
efficient; the quality of investments of this rent was flawed owing to poor 
feasibility studies, with 60% of new industries inoperative in the 1980s; 
cadres are poor. Public firms are losing money and only the monopolies are 
profitable. The public sector implements only 20% of its plan goals. The 
public sector has not been reformed, with reform still a matter discussed by 
committees because there is no political will to do so. The government 
should strengthen the better public firms.  
As for the private sector, there are also weaknesses. Firms are mostly 
family based, relying n relatives, limited in size, evading the law e.g. on 
taxes, with only a few modern plants up to international standards and few 
joint stock companies. Indeed, industrialists are becoming traders. Tariff 
protection has not yet been phased out and the coming implementation of 
trade agreements could destroy industry since industrial rehabilitation is not 
accompanying the opening to trade as it did in Tunisia, which was 
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successful in adapting its industry. GAFTA exemptions are given to 
undeserving firms. Studies on the modernization of industry, which were 
incorporated into the 10th 5-Year Plan, remain unimplemented. Some 36 
textile companies out of 24,000 are being modernized. 
Comment: Was there really a consensus on a plan of action of industrial 
reform which went unimplemented? Or was it a lack of the needed skills 
and financing to implement it? 
4) Syria’s International Relations 
The Regional Context of Reform (Marwan Kabalan) 
Syria needs a foreign policy and external environment compatible with 
internal reform needs. Regional conflicts obstruct reform while foreign 
policy has been used to get economic resources to avoid reform. Economic 
aid makes one dependent, even though Syria never accepted strings on its 
aid. In the Cold war, Soviet and Arab aid delayed reforms; the end of this 
has some benefits in that it creates the need to be more productive within 
and to export more. Bashar has tried to use the EU agreements to leverage 
reform within until this was put on hold by the deterioration of external 
relations with the failure of the peace process, the war in Iraq and the crisis 
in Lebanon. In this crisis, regime survival was at stake and reform was put 
on hold. With the pressures now relieved, the situation for reform has 
improved. 
Syria-Lebanon Relations (Hamidi al-Abdullah) 
Syrian-Lebanese relations are unique, but they have been weakened and 
Syria’s ten years there did not improve them. Many of Syria’s allies, such as 
Hariri and Junblatt, deserted it. At the level of identity there is a lack of 
consensus among Lebanese on an Arab nationalist identity; rather identity is 
Lebanese and even the Sunnis don’t talk as if they were Arab. 
Economic relations are weak, in part because Lebanon is based on free 
trade and Syria on protection for industry, the origin of the original break in 
the Custom’s Union after independence. But common economic interests 
are what could strengthen relations on the China-Taiwan model where the 
different systems do not prevent economic relations. Lebanese banks are 
entering Syria and Lebanese bankers are very influential in Beirut. GAFTA 
is opening Syria, which is moving toward a service economy similar to 
Lebanon’s that should attract Lebanese investment.  
Comment by Sami Moubayed: Lebanon’s identity is less Lebanese than 
sectarian, fragmented by region and sect. US-Saudi influence in Lebanon 
will constrain Syria-Lebanese economic relations. The terrorist attack in 
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Damascus had a Lebanese hand. The exchange of embassies is interpreted 
differently: for us it was to show we respected Lebanese sovereignty.  
Comment: Lebanon cannot survive economically without Syria. But 
Syria managed the security relation poorly and we have found the Lebanese 
Chamber of Commerce is uninterested in economic relations with Syria. 
The grey economy of cross border movement to work and shop is 
significant but not investments. 
EU-Syrian Relations (Maximiliano Trento) 
The US-Europe alignment to isolate Syria, backed by Saudi Arabia, was 
discredited by its failure. Syria was able to remain steadfast by manipulating 
a multi-polar world, cultivating relations with Russia, China and Turkey. 
Implementing the Dubai model of a service economy allowed attraction of 
Gulf capital despite the Saudi attempt to isolate Syria. The 2006 Lebanon 
war and the 2008 Hizbollah coup in Beirut showed Europe that engagement 
with Syria could not be avoided. Europe also wants to see if it can 
manipulate Syria to isolate Iran and Hizbollah. Although neo-liberalism is 
discredited at home, especially by the financial crisis, the EU still tries to 
export it abroad.  
Comment by Samer Lathikani: Europe looks at Syria through Israeli 
and Lebanese lens. The EU is also constrained by its US alliance: they 
followed the US policy of isolating Syria even though they did not fully 
agree on it. When Rice said the policy of the US on Syria was behaviour 
change, not regime change, this was the green light to Sarkozy to engage 
with Syria. Improvement in EU-Syrian relations resulted from the Turkey-
mediated talks with Israel.  
Comment: Europe failed in the region due to its excessive following of 
US policy. Syria-Europe trade is declining. 
Syrian-Turkey Relations (Bulant Aras) 
The Syrian-Turkey rapprochement is remarkable given Turkey’s earlier 
alienation from the Arabs and Syria’s perception of the Israel-Turkish 
alliance as a threat. The agreement over water helped, as both sides were 
able to share water and irrigate their lands. Turkey and Syria share common 
interests regarding the Kurds and Iraq. Turkey aims to stabilize the region 
against the threats of Iraqi fragmentation, US attack on Iran and unpopular 
US dominance in the region. The Turkish role in mediating with Israel is 
confined to conveying messages; there is still disagreement over the Syrian-
Israeli border, with Israel wanting adjustments for security reasons. 
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The Syrian-Israeli Peace Process  
(Dr. Riyad Dawoodi, Syrian chief negotiator with Israel) 
At the beginning of the 1990 Madrid peace process Israeli Prime Minister 
Shamir’s strategy was to stall. Syria’s attempt to coordinate the Arab 
position at the Madrid conference was frustrated by the PLO and Jordan 
who pursued their own interests. Later informal negotiations led to the 
“Rabin deposit” or guarantee that Israel would withdraw completely from 
the Golan, which allowed negotiations to go forward. These focused on 
Israel’s security demands and reached a document on security principles. 
The Israelis also were bargaining over where the 4 June 1967 line actually 
was. Even though Rabin was assassinated, the Wye plantation negotiations 
in which the Israelis, Syrians and US were together in the same house 
looked optimistic until Peres went for early elections. There were suicide 
bombings in Israel and because Syria would not condemn them, this was 
used to disrupt the negotiations.  Subsequently, under Netanyahu, the 
Israelis tried to renege on the Rabin Deposit. His slogan was “peace for 
peace,” hoping to use force to impose a solution of the Palestinians and 
leave the Golan as an open issue to be bargained over. Ron Lauder, a 
Netanyahu friend, moved secretly between Israel and Syria and surprising 
progress was achieved without the involvement of the Americans; but this 
failed because the Israelis would not commit on the 4 June line. Barak was 
elected and the Shepardstown negotiations started. Barak said he would not 
deny or acknowledge the Rabin deposit and denied that UN 242 was 
relevant. There was bargaining over where the 4 June line was and Israel 
said it wanted more than its entitlement of the Golan waters under 
international water-sharing norms. Clinton hinted to Asad that he had good 
news and they met in Geneva in 2000 but Asad was given a map reflecting 
Israeli demands and he rejected it.  
Like Hafiz, Bashar adopted peace as a strategic aim. After the Hariri 
assassination, the threat to Syria was severe and it was isolated. The 2006 
Israeli war was to destroy Hezbollah and was also aimed at Syria. As it 
bogged down, Israeli military sources wanted to negotiate with Syria, but 
the US insisted the war continue. The post-war UN resolution on 
embargoing arms to Hizbollah will not be implemented without Syria’s 
agreement. The war showed Israel’s vulnerability and encouraged it to 
consider indirect negotiations with Syria as an alternative way to get 
security. We told the Israelis peace is the way to get security but the US did 
not want the Syrian track to proceed. Turkey intervened and conveyed the 
message from the Israelis that they were giving priority to the Syrian track.  
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The Syrian-Israeli Peace Process (Dr. Rizk Elias) 
The context is that the opportunity for peace was lost in 1990 chiefly 
because Ehud Barak feared the political costs of removing the settlements 
from the Golan. Now the linkage of the Syrian-Israeli issue to other regional 
crises such as that over Iran makes it more difficult to reach peace. On the 
other hand, the Israel-Hizbollah conflict of 2006 was the first war when the 
Israeli interior was affected, showing it to be vulnerable. After that, Israeli 
demands in peace discussions were reduced: they concede the borders will 
be those of June 1967 and water rights will be negotiated. They want to 
keep Mt Hermon but we insist on total evacuation. However, Hizbollah 
cannot be used to challenge Israel again.  
What kind of peace would likely result? The Israelis asked in the 1990s 
if Syria would sign a separate peace and Syrian negotiator Allaf said that if 
we did we still would not forget Palestine. The Golan is one of four tracks 
each of which may move at separate speeds. Syria would reach a “cold” 
correct peace with Israel separate from the Palestinians.  
Comment of Tahsin Halabi (in charge of the Israel file at the foreign 
ministry). US policy under Bush meant the loss of the last eight years of the 
peace process. Nothing can be achieved until Bush goes. Syria’s initiative 
with Turkey mediating with Israel was to neutralize the US. Various Israeli 
leaders have said in principle they would withdraw from the Golan, but this 
could have just been maneuvers.  
Comment: I am one of those shocked at the Turkish mediation of peace 
talks with Israel. Why after our victory in Lebanon and the lifting of 
external pressures do we pursue this?  
Syrian official responds: This is a mere dialogue, in the verbal stage of 
exploring the terms of reference and it has not become an input into actual 
decisions. Neither is this a big break in Syria’s policy: when [in the 1990s] 
Israel expressed a willingness to withdraw to the 6 June borders we 
responded.  
Comment: Syria has more credibility in talks with Israel because of 
Israel’s failure to destroy Hezbollah in the 2006 war, because of US failures 
in Iraq and because of the emergence of Iran as a player in the Arab world. 
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